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 2 
Introduction 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) recently became the third Arab country and first Gulf 
state to advance an agreement normalizing relations with Israel—the first Arab nation to do so in 
26 years.1 After United States President Donald Trump announced the historic deal on August 
13, 2020, Bahrain quickly followed suit on September 11 with its own agreement to formalize 
ties to Israel.2 Leaders from Israel, the US, the UAE, and Bahrain ultimately convened at the 
White House on September 15 to officially sign the Abraham Accords, which established 
bilateral normalization agreements between Israel and its new Gulf partners, as well as 
inaugurated a new era in Middle East foreign policy.3 In addition to Bahrain, the UAE’s new 
partnership with Israel also allowed for Sudan and Morocco to normalize ties to Israel and join 
the Abraham Accords—albeit motivated by American incentives.4 Even Muslim-majority 
Kosovo took advantage of this shift in Israeli foreign affairs to establish diplomatic ties to Israel, 
and Bhutan—which does not even have official relations with the US or China—also recently 
normalized ties to Israel. 5 Many speculate that Oman, Saudi Arabia, or Tunisia may be next to 
take such steps.6 
 
1 David Makovsky, “How the Abraham Accords Look Forward, Not Back,” The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 16, 2020; Ann M. Callahan, “The Abraham 
Accords and Future Prospects,” Universidad de Navarra, December 22, 2020. 
2 Jacob Magid and Raphael Ahren, “Bahrain Establishing Full Diplomatic Relations with Israel, Trump Announces,” 
The Times of Israel, September 11, 2020.  
3 Quint Forgey, “'The Dawn of a New Middle East': Trump Celebrates Abraham Accords with White House Signing 
Ceremony,” POLITICO, POLITICO, September 15, 2020.  
4 Carmiel Arbit, Cameron Hudson, and Jonathan H. Ferziger, “Experts React: Sudan and Israel Reach Historic Peace 
Agreement,” Atlantic Council, Atlantic Council, October 23, 2020; “Israel, Morocco to Exchange Delegations next 
Month to Push Normalization Deal,” The Times of Israel, January 29, 2021. 
5 "An Awkward Embrace," The Economist, Sep 12, 2020, 41; Rami Ayyub, “Israel and Kosovo Establish 
Diplomatic Relations in Virtual Ceremony,” Reuters, February 1, 2021; Lahav Harkov, “Israel Normalizes Ties with 
Bhutan,” The Jerusalem Post, December 13, 2020. 
6 Michael Rubin, “Who Will Israel Open Diplomatic Relations with next? Saudi Arabia? Oman?” American 
Enterprise Institute, August 17, 2020.  
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 Israel’s agreement with the UAE—formally named the ‘Abraham Accords Peace 
Agreement: Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the United 
Arab Emirates and the State of Israel’—culminated decades of clandestine and increasingly overt 
connections between the two countries.7 From initial furtive security and intelligence cooperation 
to the growth in secret business and trade deals, Emirati-Israeli collaboration continued to 
strengthen in past decades.8 And with displays of public diplomacy and symbolic overtures in 
cultural events, these apparent connections between Israel and the UAE in recent years prompted 
many to envision an eventual formalization of this unofficial cooperation, though believed to be 
contingent on Israeli-Palestinian peace.9 In this sense, the Abraham Accords were surprising, not 
because normalization between the Gulf States and Israel was a novel idea, but because 
formalizing relations between Israel and an Arab nation defied the presumed precondition of a 
settlement with the Palestinians.10 
 In this thesis, I aim to explain the timing of the UAE’s normalization of relations with 
Israel, analyzing the Abraham Accords as a key case to understand the politics of normalization 
more generally. By investigating the history and evolution of Emirati-Israeli relations and 
analyzing theories of normalization, I intend to identify the conditions under which states decide 
to establish normal relations and elucidate why Israel and the UAE ultimately chose to do so. 
Recognizing that the UAE’s decision to normalize ties to Israel largely paved the way for others 
to follow, I will be focusing my research on the evolution of Emirati-Israeli relations in 
 
7 “Abraham Accords Peace Agreement: Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the 
United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel,” opened for Signature September 15, 2020, White House Statements & 
Releases; Steve Hendrix, “Inside the Secret-Not-Secret Courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates,” 
The Washington Post, August 14, 2020, sec. Middle East. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Philip Gordon, Report, Institute for National Security Studies, 2017, Accessed November 9, 2020. 
10 Ibid. 
 4 
particular, which more clearly underscore the conditions under which states decide to formalize 
tacit cooperation.11 
 Several important factors have been identified to account for this shift in Emirati-Israeli 
relations. First, the UAE has portrayed and defended normalization as a strategic incentive to 
prevent Israeli annexation in the West Bank.12 Although some scholars believe that the Accords 
instead indicate the marginalization of the Palestinian question—especially in contradicting the 
prevailing 2002 Arab Peace Initiative conditioning peace on a settlement with the Palestinians—
the Palestinian cause remains a crucial consideration for the agreement.13 Second, the Accords 
were largely facilitated by the mutual interest in containing the Iranian threat and countering its 
regional influence and nuclear ambitions.14 This motive is apparent even to the Iranians, as 
influential Iranian politician Ali Motahari went so far as to concede his country’s guilt, 
acknowledging that “we have frightened the Arabs and caused them to look to Israel as a foil.”15 
Third, the role of the US in brokering the agreement is pronounced and exceptional. Not only did 
Israel’s traditionally close relations with the US and the personal friendship of President Trump 
and Prime Minister Netanyahu further advance this historic moment for Israel, but the incentive 
to purchase F-35 Joint Strike Fighters also demonstrates America’s critical role in facilitating the 
 
11 “Bahrain Follows UAE to Normalise Ties with Israel,” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera Media Network, September 12, 
2020. 
12 Yousef Al Otaiba, “Annexation Will Be a Serious Setback for Better Relations with the Arab World,” ynetnews, 
June 12, 2020. 
13 Rauf Baker, “The Israel-UAE Peace Deal: A Master Stroke,” Edited by Efraim Karsh, Mideast Security and 
Policy Studies No. 180 (September 2020): 17–19; “Arab Peace Initiative,” S. Daniel Abraham Center for Peace, 
Accessed November 9, 2020. 
14 Udi Dekel and Noa Shusterman, “Behind the Scenes of the Abraham Accords: Insights from an INSS Cabinet,” 
The Institute for National Security Studies, September 24, 2020.  
15 Ray Takeyh, “Are Gulf Arab States Aligning Toward Israel?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign 
Relations, August 17, 2020. 
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Abraham Accords.16 Yet, there are also more general circumstances that enable and support the 
normalization of relations between two countries, which I will ultimately highlight in this thesis.  
In researching the timing and conditions under which Israel and the UAE decided to 
normalize relations, I anticipate this thesis to have consequential and pertinent theoretical and 
policy implications. First, by investigating the literature of normalization, I intend to provide a 
framework with which to consider the possibility of other Gulf States following suit and 
normalizing relations with Israel. Second, I explore the effectiveness of and potential for tacit 
cooperation to be used as a foreign policy strategy to achieve normal relations with another state. 
Overall, I expect my analysis of the Abraham Accords to be relevant for studies of cooperation, 
negotiation, conflict resolution, and normalization. 
 This thesis ultimately examines the culmination of a decades-long normalization process 
between the UAE and Israel, as codified in the Abraham Accords. First, I will define 
‘normalization,’ explain its significance in analyzing the Accords, and demonstrate its value as a 
conflict resolution strategy. Next, I will describe the history of Israel’s pursuit of normalization 
and compare Israel’s treaties with Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE to emphasize the unique nature of 
the Abraham Accords. Then, I will analyze the theories that explain normalization, which 
conceptually support the normalization efforts between the UAE and Israel leading up to the 
Accords. Subsequently, I advance a twofold theory to explain the Abraham Accords as the 
official normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE, followed by a discussion of the 
empirical evidence to underpin this theory. To conclude, I will consider the implications of my 
research on the possibility of other Gulf States pursuing formal relations with Israel, the potential 
 
16 Dana Stroul and Barbara A. Leaf, “The F-35 Triangle: America, Israel, the United Arab Emirates,” War on the 
Rocks, September 15, 2020.  
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for tacit cooperation to serve as a strategy for states seeking normalization with other countries, 
and the future of the strategic order of the Middle East as a result of the Abraham Accords.  
 7 
Defining ‘Normalization’ 
The Importance of Normalization 
In the discourse and analysis surrounding the Abraham Accords, people often use terms 
such as ‘diplomatic relations,’ ‘recognition,’ and ‘normalization’ interchangeably. However, 
each of these terms has a distinct meaning and connotation that profoundly affect not only the 
conversation of UAE-Israel relations but also this thesis. Therefore, it is important to distinguish 
the meanings of each of these terms and establish the centrality of ‘normalization’ when 
investigating the formation of the Abraham Accords. 
First, it would be erroneous to claim that the most profound aspect of the Accords is the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, which are simply the prerequisite for official diplomacy 
between two countries.17 As described in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, diplomatic 
relations are “the handle which opens the door to the establishment of embassies, both resident 
and non-resident, to the easy despatch of special missions, and hence to all the activity in which 
diplomats commonly engage.”18 In essence, the fact that two countries now have the ability to 
establish embassies, exchange ambassadors, and formally communicate through government 
representatives is not the most salient and remarkable component of the Accords. 
Second, recognition alone does not encapsulate the duration, depth, and diversity of the 
longstanding tacit cooperation that preceded the Accords. In Ray E. E. Johnston’s work on 
international recognition of states—specifically those resulting from partition—Johnston 
concludes that recognition is a political, not legal, determination, likening international 
 
17 Ralph G. Feltham, “Diplomatic Relations,” in Diplomatic Handbook: Eighth Edition (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2012), pp. 1-8. 
18 Alan James, “Diplomatic Relations between States,” in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. Costas M. 
Constantinou, Pauline Kerr, and Paul Sharp (Los Angeles, California: SAGE, 2016), pp. 257-267. 
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recognition to a “series of votes of confidence given by outsiders.”19 While unrecognized states 
do actively seek this respect from other countries, focusing solely on the recognition component 
of the Accords obscures the decades of implicit recognition and increasing respect and trust 
between the two parties through furtive cooperation.20 
 
What is ‘Normalization?’ 
 Normalization—the focal point of this thesis—is difficult to define. Not only does the 
meaning of the term vary based on the country in question, but the discourse is also highly 
dependent on the region at hand. However, there are several works that, when examined 
together, can assemble a more cohesive idea of normalization. Before analyzing these 
contributions to the study of normalization, I draw upon the subsequent literature and outline a 
definition of ‘normalization’ for the purpose of this thesis:  
an ongoing process of increasing, deepening connections between two states to improve 
bilateral relations, as well as a conflict resolution strategy pursued before, during, and 
after a formal normalization agreement to alter the cost-benefit balance so that it is costly 
to maintain the status quo and advantageous to pursue and maintain full normalization. 
  
In their analysis of normalization, Eiki Berg and Raul Toomla construct a “normalisation 
index” that assesses a state’s integration into international society, its foreign trade, and its 
communications.21 Although the index measures a state’s integration with the global community 
as a whole, the variables used in their calculations are key indicators for what bilateral 
normalization entails. In citing Dov Lynch’s advocacy for “a combined package of measures—
 
19 Ray E. E. Johnston, “Problems of International Status and International Recognition of New Nations Resulting 
from Partition,” Asian Perspective 6, no. 1 (1982): pp. 133-150. 
20 James Ker-Lindsay, “Engagement without Recognition: the Limits of Diplomatic Interaction with Contested 
States,” International Affairs 91, no. 2 (March 2015): pp. 267-285. 
21 Eiki Berg and Raul Toomla, “Forms of Normalisation in the Quest for De Facto Statehood,” The International 
Spectator 44, no. 4 (2009): pp. 27-45. 
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economic, security, confidence-building and societal—that will support normalization,” Berg 
and Toomla reinforce these diverse channels of interaction between countries as an important 
element of normalization, especially in the case of Israel and the Gulf states.22  
 Not only do Berg and Toomla properly identify the character of normalization as 
encompassing a wide assortment of connections between countries, but their ‘normalisation 
index’ also demonstrates that normalization efforts exist in different degrees prior to official 
normalization.23 However, their definition of normalization falls short. In focusing on the quest 
for international recognition by ‘de facto states’—a category that explicitly excludes Israel—
Berg and Toomla inadequately contend that normalization is solely driven by the desire to attain 
legitimacy.24 However, the aspiration for legitimacy alone is insufficient to explain the incentive 
for both states to pursue normalization. In effect, this rationale only accounts for the pariah 
state’s objective for achieving normalization, neglecting to account for the accepted state’s 
motive for normalizing relations with the unrecognized state.  
 Perhaps the most relevant and applicable work with a more comprehensive definition of 
normalization is Gadi Hitman and Chen Kertcher’s paper on Arab-Israeli normalization during 
conflict. In analyzing conflict resolution efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hitman and Kertcher 
identify two strategies—normalization and reconciliation—that create positive relations between 
actors. First, the authors explicitly define normalization as “a strategy that focuses on structural 
issues that aim to improve the relations between the actors through the establishment of 
diplomatic relations, cooperation on economic issues, security arrangements and other affairs.”25 
 
22 Ibid, 29. 
23 Ibid, 43. 
24 Ibid, 27. 
25 Gadi Hitman and Chen Kertcher, “The Case for Arab-Israeli Normalization during Conflict,” The Journal for 
Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies 2 (2018): pp. 43-63. 
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This description mirrors the diverse channels of normalization outlined by Berg and Toomla. 
Yet, Hitman and Kertcher also distinguish a separate strategy of reconciliation, which involves 
cultural issues such as the media, educational programs, and cultural exchanges. In embracing 
Hitman and Kertcher’s notion that these two strategies together work to develop positive 
relations between the states in the conflict—and recognizing the ambiguity of the “other affairs” 
included in their definition of normalization—I proceed by combining the two strategies under 
the one umbrella term ‘normalization,’ as it comprehensively encompasses all actions that states 
can pursue to improve relations. 
 Notably, Hitman and Kertcher also identify a more comprehensive and applicable 
explanation for why states pursue normalization, especially in regards to Arab-Israeli relations. 
As opposed to the one-sided notion that normalization is predicated on one state aspiring for 
legitimacy, Hitman and Kertcher view normalization as a two-sided strategy utilized to resolve 
conflict. In such ‘intractable’ conflicts—which are strongly rooted in socio-political-cultural 
identities, are prone to violence, and involve multiple actors—leaders view the conflict as a zero-
sum game in which the costs of resolution are perceived to be larger than remaining in conflict.26 
The Arab-Israeli conflict aptly fits this description of ‘intractability’ as a regional conflict with a 
history of violence and driven by a powerful, all-encompassing grievance—the Arab states’ 
refusal to accept Israel’s assertion as independent, sovereign state.27 Ultimately, Hitman and 
Kertcher demonstrate that actors in an ‘intractable’ conflict pursue normalization as a conflict 
resolution tactic. With the goal of settling a longstanding dispute, both states decide to alter the 
cost-benefit balance so that it is no longer too costly to make peace. In effect, implementing a 
 
26 Ibid, 45. 
27 Ibid, 46. 
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policy of normalization progressively lowers the cost and magnifies the benefit of eventually 
establishing normal relations. 
 These foundational grounds for normalization are based on Hitman and Kertcher’s 
important rejection of a concrete sequential order to conflict resolution. Recognizing that the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in particular is rather apt to “multi-dyadic conflict resolution processes,” 
Hitman and Kertcher contend that normalization does not necessarily need to proceed a peace 
settlement.28 In fact, the authors assert that normalization can occur before, during, and after a 
peace agreement has been reached.29 Hitman and Kertcher summarize their findings: 
“Normalization is not just a tool for analysis or a strategy for a positivistic sequential 
spectrum; it is a tool that can build trust through shared interests and can ultimately 
contribute to the chances of the signing of peace agreements.”30 
 
Hence, not only can normalization take place at any and all stages of the conflict resolution 
process, but Hitman and Kertcher also emphasize its potential to enhance the success of a peace 
settlement when a strategy of normalization is initiated in advance to foster trust and shared 
interests.31 This development further highlights another critical element of normalization—the 
distinction between a ‘cold peace’ and ‘warm peace.’ Although Egypt and Jordan concluded full 
peace agreements with Israel, the minimal normalization efforts that preceded and followed 
render these bilateral relationships a ‘cold peace’ by scholars.32 In contrast, a ‘warm peace’ 
characterizes a peace agreement that has been “solidified by normalization.”33 Reflecting upon 
Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel, Russell E. Lucas explains the inevitable failure of 
normalization attempts between Israel and Jordan following the agreement and the ineluctable 
 
28 Ibid, 51.  
29 Ibid, 52. 
30 Ibid, 62. 
31 Ibid. 
32 David Daoud and Varsha Koduvayur, “Welcome to a Brand-New Middle East,” Foreign Policy, September 30, 
2020. 
33 Ibid, 50. 
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cold peace that resulted. In effect, Lucas directly equates successful normalization with the 
unattainable warm peace between Israel and Jordan that could have exposed and embraced their 
covert cooperation and been “a stepping-stone to a new regional order.”34 
 Similarly, in assessing the 1979 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, Marie-
Christine Aulas highlights the peculiarity of normalization being explicitly stipulated in the 
peace treaty, which indicates a sense of obligation rather than a genuine, voluntary choice. 
Indeed, Aulas maintains that this “normalization is binding on the future, and in fact is binding 
on peace itself,” which emphasizes a fundamental element of a cold peace.35 Although Hitman 
and Kertcher conclude that normalization can occur at any and all points in the conflict 
resolution process, Aulas emphasizes that normalization efforts that are only first introduced in a 
peace treaty and expected to burgeon accordingly are destined to fall short and result in a cold 
peace. Yet, agreements that are grounded in an existing normalization process and then codified 
in a treaty are much more easily facilitated and more likely to develop into a warm peace. 
 It is important to understand that normalization is an ongoing process that can occur 
before, during, and after a peace treaty. In particular, one can see how pre-treaty collaboration 
effectively increases the chances of peace and official relations between two countries, as 
demonstrated by Hitman and Kertcher. When normalization efforts precede a formal agreement, 
I ultimately argue that normalization can be used as a deliberate strategy to facilitate 
rapprochement and peace, as well as build a genuine and dynamic relationship predicated on the 
stability of cooperation, trust, and respect. In essence, the Abraham Accords’ centrality around 
normalization reflects the unique nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, along with an equally unique 
 
34 Russell E. Lucas, “The Death of Normalization with Israel,” Middle East Journal 58, no. 1 (2004): pp. 93-111. 
35 Marie-Christine Aulas, “The Normalization of Egyptian-Israeli Relations,” Arab Studies Quarterly 5, no. 3 
(1983): pp. 220-236. 
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tool to resolve it. And—with the convergence of an increasingly threatening security landscape, 
the leverage of the US as a broker, and the opportunity of annexation in the West Bank—Israel 
and the UAE seized an opportunity in 2020 to build upon their foundation of cooperation and 
normalization efforts to officially normalize relations through the Abraham Accords. 
 
The Value of Normalization 
 As exemplified by the work of Hitman and Kertcher, normalization is a two-sided 
conflict resolution strategy that aims to settle longstanding conflict by altering the cost-benefit 
balance so that peace is no longer costly and instead beneficial. This view is also shared by 
Frederick Z. Brown, who asserts that normalization “is not a fixed destination [nor] the absence 
of conflict, it is the management of conflict.”36 In his comparison of American normalization 
efforts with both Vietnam and Cuba, Brown outlines several incentives for normalizing relations, 
ranging from economic and political advantages to family reconciliation. In the case of Cuba in 
particular, Dan Glickman echoes this assertion, contending that “all parties stand to benefit from 
the normalization of relations”—advantages that would manifest in trade flows, international 
diplomacy, and regional cooperation on immigration, the environment, agriculture, and even 
narcotics and human trafficking.37 Yet, despite these acknowledged potential benefits, Brown 
highlights an important dimension of the normalization process that often hinders the pursuit of 
full normalization and its benefits—the dynamic between the accepted and unaccepted states. 
For instance, while official normalization was crucial for Vietnam and economically vital for 
 
36 Frederick Z. Brown, “Cuba, Vietnam, and ‘Normalization,’” Implications of Normalization (American University, 
May 2016). 
37 Dan Glickman, “Why Normalized US-Cuba Relations Benefit Both Countries,” The Aspen Institute, November 
30, 2016. 
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Cuba to attain, it was simply not a “life-or-death issue” for the US, who had the strong hand and 
flexibility to pursue normalization at its own pace, despite the evident gains for both sides.38  
I. William Zartman reconciles this asymmetric dynamic with the cost-benefit analysis of 
normalization through his concept of ‘ripeness,’ which explains how states are able to overcome 
the status quo to attain the profuse gains of official normalization.39 In such aforementioned 
‘intractable’ conflicts, two states are stuck in a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS), which harms 
both sides in a continuous conflict in which neither party can win.40 Yet, states are able to 
resolve this MHS—which is based on a cost-benefit analysis and is consistent with the notion 
that states are ‘loss-averse’—when both states perceive a moment of ripeness that allows both 
sides to pursue a “way out” of the MHS.41 William M. LeoGrande similarly explains this 
decision to escape the cost of the status quo and capitalize on potential gains of normalization 
through the work of John W. Kingdon.42 In his study on policy change, Kingdon identifies three 
‘streams’ that must converge in order to facilitate major policy change, especially in such 
“longstanding, well-entrenched policies and programmes.”43 These three elements include the 
presence of policy change on policymakers’ agendas, the availability of a feasible policy 
solution, and the political viability of the policy solution.44 LeoGrande further emphasizes the 
political obstacles to embracing the advantages of normalization by presenting David A. Welch’s 
theory of foreign policy change. Recognizing that policymakers are risk-averse and that “inertia 
 
38 Frederick Z. Brown, “Cuba, Vietnam, and ‘Normalization,’” Implications of Normalization (American University, 
May 2016). 
39 I. William Zartman, “Ripeness,” Beyond Intractability, September 17, 2020. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 William M. LeoGrande, “Normalizing US–Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past,” International 
Affairs 91, no. 3 (2015): pp. 473-474. 
43 Ibid, 473. 
44 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. (Harlow: Pearson, 2014). 
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is the prevailing dynamic” of policymaking, Welch contends that overcoming this stalemate 
requires the perception that maintaining the status quo has become seriously costly.45  
Ultimately, these theories and concepts explain the conditions necessary for states to 
overcome the disadvantages of the status quo and decide to pursue the mutual advantages of 
normalization. Even when attaining official normalization is more urgent for one state than the 
other, both states can assess the cost-benefit balance, recognize the value of normalization, and 
take advantage of a moment of ripeness to overcome political obstacles and officially normalize 
relations. As exemplified through American normalization efforts with Cuba and Vietnam, as 
well as Israeli relations with the Gulf states, full normalization proffers an assortment of gains 
for both parties. Along with political, economic, social, strategic, and cultural advantages, 
official normalization and peacebuilding also provide shared benefits through cooperation in 
public health, agriculture, security, energy, environment, and regional development.46  
Just as the United States and Cuba had much to gain from normalization—despite their 
longstanding stalemate—the Arab-Israeli conflict is also characterized as a web of bilateral 
relationships riddled with largely untapped potential and mutual benefits.47 Official 
normalization and its shared advantages were long presumed to be too costly for Arab nations in 
particular—mainly due to the assumption that the Arab Peace Initiative prevailed as the 
precondition for Arab-Israeli normalization, as well as the perception by risk-averse Arab nations 
that policy change would be too harmful.48 However, as evident by the vast history of tacit 
 
45 William M. LeoGrande, “Normalizing US–Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past,” International 
Affairs 91, no. 3 (2015): pp. 474; David A. Welch,  Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change, Princeton; 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005. 
46 Mai Albzour et al., “Support for ‘Normalization’ of Relations Between Palestinians and Israelis, and How It 
Relates to Contact and Resistance in the West Bank,” Journal of Social and Political Psychology 7, no. 2 (December 
18, 2019): pp. 978-996. 
47 “Assessing Israel's Trade With Its Arab Neighbours,” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, August 14, 2018. 
48 Yoel Guzansky, “Israel and the Arab Gulf States: From Tacit Cooperation to Reconciliation?” Israel Affairs 21 
(2015): pp. 131-147. 
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cooperation and the increasingly deep and overt connections between Israel and the Arab world 
in recent years, both sides were aware of the advantages of attaining closer ties and normalizing 
relations. In effect, this system of tacit cooperation enabled the Gulf states to amass the benefits 
of ties to Israel “without having to pay the price in terms of a febrile domestic base or wider 
regional challenges to their legitimacy.”49 However, the Abraham Accords’ agenda to conclude 
bilateral agreements in a variety of spheres of mutual interest—everything from trade and 
investment to tourism and healthcare—reveals that there was still much to gain by both parties 
by embracing full normalization.50 Consequently, both Israel and the UAE identified immense 
value in their decision to formally normalize relations—mutual gains that were ultimately 
calculated to outweigh the perceived costs of breaking free from the status quo during a moment 




49 Clive Jones and Yoel Guzansky, Fraternal Enemies: Israel and the Gulf Monarchies (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2019), 190. 
50 “Abraham Accords Peace Agreement: Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the 
United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel,” opened for Signature September 15, 2020, White House Statements & 
Releases. 
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Israel's Pursuit of Normalization 
 Since its creation in 1948, Israel has had an exceptionally difficult and long pursuit of 
normal relations with its neighbors. Just hours after declaring independence, Israel was 
immediately countered by a declaration of war and invasion by five Arab countries (Egypt, 
Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon), and subsequent conflicts in 1956, 1967, and 1973 
exemplify the violent escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the hostile relations between 
Israel and its surrounding states.51 Meanwhile, the Arab League in 1967 famously declared “no 
peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it,” and this sentiment from the 
Khartoum Resolutions has generally endured in the region and has continued to guide Arab 
states’ foreign policy with Israel today.52 However, it is important to note that several 
countries—including many of the Gulf States—have pursued informal, largely secretive 
connections to Israel, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and the 
UAE.53 Yet, Israel’s endeavors to normalize relations with the Arab world have been 
considerably difficult and continue to be a struggle today. Overall, Israel’s historically hostile 
and clandestine relations with its Arab neighbors have been anything but normal. 
 It was not until 1978 that Israel found success with the Camp David Accords, rendering 
Egypt the first Arab nation to normalize relations with Israel.54 The culmination of years of 
secret negotiations, the treaty outlined the specific terms of peace after 30 years of conflict.55 
 
51 Said Aly, Abdel Monem, Shai Feldman, and Khalīl Shiqāqī, Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the 
Middle East, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
52 Ibid; “The Khartoum Resolutions,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1, 1967. 
53 Gadi Hitman and Chen Kertcher, “The Case for Arab-Israeli Normalization during Conflict,” The Journal for 
Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies 2 (2018): pp. 43-63. 
54 “An Enduring Peace: 25 Years after the Camp David Accords,” Wilson Center, October 23, 2003.  
55 Arash Beidollah Khani, “Egyptian–Israeli Relations, History, Progress, Challenges and Prospects in the Middle 
East,” Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) 7, no. 3 (2013): pp. 93-120; Michael Yaffe, Robert 
Barron, and Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, “Middle East Peace: What Can We Learn from Camp David 40 Years 
Later?” United States Institute of Peace, March 26, 2019; “Peace Treaty Between the State of Israel and the Arab 
Republic of Egypt,” conclusion date: March 26, 1979, United Nations Peacemaker. 
 18 
Yet, by ending hostilities and normalizing relations with Israel, Egypt was cast a regional 
pariah—ousted from regional institutions and diplomatic relations with its Arab neighbors—and 
overwhelming opposition to the treaty escalated to the murder of President Anwar Sadat in 
1981.56 However, having understood that its inferior military was no match for Israeli forces and 
that maintaining the status quo would exacerbate its socioeconomic problems, Sadat pursued 
peace and normal relations as a logical, tactical move to end its pernicious conflict with Israel.57 
In this sense, Egypt’s normalization with Israel was an existential choice to benefit its security 
and wellbeing—accepting domestic and regional backlash as the price for the value of peace and 
cooperation with Israel. 
 The second Arab country to normalize ties to Israel was Jordan in 1994, establishing full 
relations and settling fundamental issues between the two states.58 After decades of conflict with 
Israel and years of clandestine meetings and negotiations, Jordan took advantage of the 
opportunity afforded by the 1993 Oslo Accords to formalize peace, reinvigorate its economy, 
and pursue closer ties to the West.59 While Jordan had the support of Egypt, the peace treaty was 
met with substantial regional opposition.60 Not only was Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
murdered one year later by an anti-peace extremist, but Syria also attempted to assassinate King 
Hussein and his brother, despite having attempted its own peace with Israel.61 Just as Egypt 
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pursued peace with Israel as a tactic to improve its economy and security, Jordan also capitalized 
on favorable conditions to prioritize its national interests and reap the benefits of normalization. 
 Among these two diplomatic successes are several failed attempts for normalization. 
While negotiations with Syria collapsed in 2000 due to border discrepancies, Turkey-mediated 
talks in 2008 eventually broke down, as well.62 The Arab Spring in Syria also impeded a secret 
US-brokered process that began in 2010.63 Lebanon, on the other hand, has been less amenable 
to normalizing relations, abrogating a 1983 security treaty a year later that planned to end 
hostilities and arrange normalization talks.64 Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has pursued several 
plurilateral attempts for formal relations with Israel, including Crown Prince Fahd bin 
Abdulaziz’s 1981 plan for regional peace, conditioned on the creation of a Palestinian state, the 
Palestinian right of return, and Israeli withdrawal from territories including East Jerusalem.65 
Another Saudi proposal—Crown Prince Abdullah’s Arab Peace Initiative (API)—was endorsed 
by the Arab League in 2002.66 In addition to Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory and a 
solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, the API predicated normalization between Israel and 
the Arab world on the establishment of a Palestinian state.67 The normalization initiative was re-
adopted by the Arab League in 2007 and has even received positive remarks by Israeli President 
Shimon Peres.68 Enshrining the Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause, the API was widely 
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viewed as the prevailing precondition and framework for any Arab state to normalize relations 
with Israel—that is, until the UAE abandoned the plan in pursuit of its own terms for normal 
relations with Israel in 2020.69 
 
Israel’s Treaties with Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE 
The text of the treaties themselves also reveals fundamental differences in their pursuits 
of normalization. First, it should be noted that both of Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and 
Jordan are highly technical documents that precisely outline the terms to end decades of hostility 
and war. Consequently, the primary purpose of these treaties is to negotiate the terms of ceasefire 
and establish peace—a novel concept in and of itself at the time—and the language is quite 
sensible and conservative. In their 1979 Treaty of Peace, Egypt and Israel agree that “the normal 
relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and 
cultural relations . . .” but only go as far as to characterize their nascent peaceful partnership as 
pursuing “good neighborly relations.”70 Jordan and Israel’s 1994 Treaty of Peace uses identical 
language, outlining their “[desire] to develop friendly relations and co-operation between 
them.”71 Yet, because these vague, nominal positive relations are deemed contingent on 
completing and upholding the terms outlined in the treaties, the rhetoric demonstrates that the 
treaties themselves are merely the starting points at which normalization efforts can begin.  
 On the other hand, the Abraham Accords are not simply a peace treaty. After all, the 
UAE and Israel have never engaged in armed conflict and therefore have no territorial disputes 
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to settle or permanent resolutions to delineate.72 Rather, the Peace Agreement is a ‘Treaty of 
Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization,’ indicating an explicit emphasis on 
formally normalizing relations between the UAE and Israel. Rather than merely committing to 
normal, friendly, and neighborly relations in the name of peace and stability, the Accords 
embrace not only the potential benefits of official normalization but also a new vision for a 
peaceful and prosperous region. It is clear from its structure and content that the primary purpose 
of the Accords is to formalize a “full normalization” of relations and specify exactly how the 
parties will effectively implement it.73 The language employed in the agreement also signifies 
both states’ dedication and genuine interest in capitalizing on this opportunity to achieve a full 
normalization of ties, emphasizing their desire to establish “co-operation and full normalization 
of ties between them and their people . . . and to chart together a new path to unlock the vast 
potential of their countries and of the region.”74 In this sense, the states clearly supersede the 
goals of peace championed by Egypt and Jordan, as the UAE and Israel optimistically 
“[reaffirm] their shared belief that the establishment of peace and full normalization between 
them can help transform the Middle East by spurring economic growth, enhancing technological 
innovation and forging closer people-to-people relations.”75 
 
The Abraham Accords 
 Aside from America’s recurrent brokering role, the presence of furtive pre-treaty 
negotiations, and the evasion of a comprehensive settlement to the Palestinian situation, the 
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Abraham Accords represent a significant divergence from Israel’s normalization agreements 
with Egypt and Jordan. First, the Accords reflect a notable shift in regional interests and public 
opinion. As opposed to the reaction to Egypt and Jordan’s peace treaties, protest against the 
Accords has been limited to obligatory and feeble condemnations by organizations, state 
officials, and political movements.76 This weak regional objection is largely due to Israel’s well-
known and pervasive collaboration with the Gulf states in recent years.77 And, notably, this lack 
of opposition indicates a discernable change in the region’s prioritization of domestic issues over 
the Palestinian cause. While the UAE justifies the Accords with its prevention of Israeli 
annexation in the West Bank, many view normalization and the abandonment of the API as 
marginalizing the Palestinian agenda.78 Yet, Michael Stephens asserts that the Accords are an 
important indication that “the two issues can be separated, politically, but also emotionally.”79 
Political scientist Hillel Frisch highlights this detachment, contending that “populations are no 
longer clamoring for pan-Arab unity, pan-Islamic unity, the caliphate . . . They want better social 
welfare, greater economic opportunity, good education, innovation, the rule of law, and equality 
before the law at home.”80  
In survey findings published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the 
Emiratis had the highest approval rating in the region of the Abraham Accords, and between 
June and October 2020, the number of those who supported business and sports ties to Israel had 
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tripled, with similar increases in Saudi and Bahraini opinion, as well.81 Meanwhile, only a 
quarter of Emiratis wanted the US to prioritize resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and 
survey results also indicated growing frustration with Palestinian leadership.82 Further, only 30% 
of Emiratis supported Hamas in the Gulf states—the second lowest approval rating above Saudi 
Arabia’s 11%—with only a quarter of Emiratis under 30 approving of Hamas.83 These findings 
notably echo Frisch’s generational diagnosis of the declining importance of the Palestinian cause 
among younger Arabs in the region. With Bahrain and Sudan—both longtime advocates for the 
Palestinians—soon following the UAE’s path towards normalization, the Accords reveal a 
significant shift in the regional consensus. Although the Arab world maintains its support for the 
Palestinian cause, these results demonstrate that it will no longer supplant domestic priorities, 
especially among the younger generations. And while the Saudis have reaffirmed its 
commitment to normalizing relations with Israel only following a deal with the Palestinians, their 
presumed direct support of the agreement indicates a remarkable shift in regional sentiment 
toward Arab normalization with Israel.84 
Second, in contrast to Israel’s ‘cold peace’ with Egypt and Jordan, the relationship 
between the UAE and Israel has already proven to be a ‘warm peace.’ Again, both Egypt and 
Jordan outlined efforts to promote greater cooperation in their respective treaties, though their 
relations with Israel remain limited, largely restricted to matters of security and diplomacy.85 
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Given the failures of Israel’s futile negotiations with other Arab states and their lack of tacit 
cooperation, it is likely that a breakthrough agreement with Syria or Lebanon would have had 
similar results. On the other hand, Israel’s ‘warm peace’ with the UAE has quickly expanded to 
areas like research collaboration, business and investment, and cultural exchange in the 
subsequent months—a level of collaboration that Egypt and Jordan have still yet to achieve.86 As 
UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash explained following the Accords, 
“sometimes you have a formal political cooperation without really the functional cooperation 
supporting it, so for us it is very important . . . to put these functional cooperations in place.”87 
This explicit embrace of a ‘warm peace’ by the UAE was a seemingly effortless transition from 
decades of tacit cooperation—genuine, pre-existing connections that ultimately facilitated the 
shift to normalized relations and formal cooperation. As opposed to the secret diplomatic talks in 
the years leading up to the 1979 and 1994 peace treaties, the informal economic, security, and 
cultural ties that accumulated over the past 50 years between the UAE and Israel effectively laid 
the foundation for an authentic and novel ‘warm peace’ between Israel and an Arab country. 
Although the timely convergence of several factors ultimately facilitated the Accords, this tacit 
cooperation was fundamental in facilitating the normalization agreement and solidifying a more 
collaborative, symbiotic partnership between Israel and the UAE as opposed to its predecessors. 
 
Causes of the Abraham Accords 
 Despite the distinctions between Israel’s normalization efforts and peace treaties with the 
Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE, there are several puzzling aspects of the Abraham Accords that 
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remain: what ultimately explains Israel and the UAE’s decision to officially normalize relations? 
Considering that Israel has ties with several Gulf states, why was the UAE the first Gulf state to 
take such formal diplomatic steps with Israel? Additionally, what accounts for the timing of the 
agreement, and why did this agreement materialize specifically in August 2020? 
 Before I can fully thoroughly answer these questions, it is important to understand how 
the long process of normalization between Israel and the UAE—especially the normalization 
efforts that preceded the agreement—was central to facilitating the Abraham Accords in the 
summer of 2020. 
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Literature Review: Theories that Explain Normalization 
 As described in depth later in this paper, the UAE and Israel have an extensive history of 
increasingly collaborative and overt cooperation that preceded the formal normalization in 2020. 
Ultimately, three main frameworks prevail that explain how these early normalization efforts and 
expanding ties enable the official normalization of relations between two states. These theories 
that explain normalization include the merits of communication theory, the functional approach, 
and the concept of a tacit security regime. 
 
Communication Theory 
  A brief from the Emirates Policy Center following the announcement of the Abraham 
Accords Declaration in August 2020 is just one of many pieces that emphasize the process of 
normalization as a critical catalyst for the agreement. In other words, this trend of “expanding 
and deepening the extent of dealings between the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict” is believed 
to be “the most important gateway to achieving stability in the region,” as well as reducing the 
chances of conflict and increasing opportunities for peacebuilding.88 The theoretical basis for this 
perspective, however, stems largely from concepts such as communication theory, which 
essentially promotes the correlation between the amount of interaction between political units in 
a region and the potential for building confidence, common interests, and stability.89 
 In his 1963 book The Nerves of Government, political scientist Karl Deutsch advances a 
pioneering theory of communication predicated on the science of cybernetics. By basing his 
communication theory on mathematician Nobert Wiener’s idea of cybernetics—the science of 
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control and communications—Deutsch foregrounds the importance of communication as “the 
cement that makes organisations [and] alone enables a group to think together, to see together, 
and to act together.”90 Although Deutsch’s ideas are quite technical and focused on explicating 
foundational concepts and terms to support his communication model, the essence of his theory 
and its emphasis on the flows of information, increased cooperation, and the amplifying effect of 
communication are consequential for the field of international relations. For instance, Deutsch’s 
assertion that the essence of politics is “the dependable coordination of human efforts and 
expectations for the attainment of the goals of society” can easily be applied to the domain of 
foreign relations.91 Yet, political scientists have since directly drawn from communication theory 
and effectively connected its ideas to international politics. In fact, in their research on 
international cooperation, Stephen J. Majeski and Shane Fricks draw upon Deutsch’s conclusion 
that communication increases trust and decreases suspicion between two actors.92  
 Incorporating neorealist assumptions, game theory, and experimentation, Majeski and 
Fricks explore whether communication allows states to cooperate more and defect less. In doing 
so, Majeski and Fricks identified several benefits that communication can confer on the 
international community, including the provision of information about choices, a greater sense of 
certainty, an understanding of coordination and trust, techniques to reduce fear and greed, and 
even a norm of intergroup cooperation or identity.93 Ultimately, the researchers conclude that 
communication is an “effective mechanism for reducing fear and establishing trust between two 
groups.”94 Not only does communication facilitate the establishment of familiarity with opposing 
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groups, but the option to withdraw also enhances cooperation and minimizes defection.95 The 
work of Majeski and Fricks, along with the foundation of Karl Deutsch’s communication theory, 
clearly demonstrates the prevailing benefits of communication in fostering cooperation. These 
merits of communication theory are evident in the tacit cooperation between the UAE and Israel, 
which has proliferated since initial contacts in the 1970s and has culminated in the Accords. 
 
Functionalism 
 Another perspective that accounts for the early cooperation between states prior to their  
official normalization stems from the theory of functionalism. Although this framework usually 
relates to international institutions—particularly the European Union and the United Nations—
this concept is constructive in analyzing inter-state integration and the potential for cooperation 
between states, as well. In terms of the UAE and Israel, a prevalent explanation for their long 
history of tacit cooperation and ultimate decision to establish formal ties revolves around the 
confluence of their common economic, security, and political interests, which aptly aligns with 
the essence of functionalism. 
 Largely viewed as the engineer of functionalist thought, David Mitrany introduced his 
functional approach to international relations in a 1948 article discussing the restructuring of the 
world order to prevent a third world war. As opposed to world federalism—which Mitrany 
contends is a quixotic endeavor—Mitrany promotes functionalism as a promising framework to 
facilitate cooperation in world politics. By focusing on common interests and needs, Mitrany 
posits that functionalism can encourage countries to work together for the common good: 
“[Functionalism] should help to shift the emphasis from political issues which divide, to 
those social issues in which the interest of the peoples is plainly akin and collective; to 




therefore, with a clear sense that the nations can be bound together into a world 
community only if we link them up by what unites, not by what divides.”96 
 
Ultimately, in “[emphasizing] the common index of need,” the functional approach embraces 
utilizing cross-national needs as a starting point for inter-state collaboration.97 By pooling 
together sovereignty rather than surrendering it to a supranational entity, functionalism also 
evades many political issues of inter-state coordination and provides valuable flexibility in 
adjusting the technical and membership considerations of inter-state arrangements. Because of 
this “virtue of technical self-determination” in which each function uniquely determines the 
nature and scope for its collaboration, Mitrany concludes that “the performance of a number of 
common functions is the way to create a normal community.”98 
 While Mitrany presents his functional approach as a postwar solution for international 
integration, the argument that inter-state arrangements based on mutual interests, common needs, 
and specific ‘functions’ can encourage cooperation is noteworthy in the context of normalization. 
In fact, in his overview of the United Nations, scholar Thomas G. Weiss recalls the impact of 
Mitrany’s contribution to international relations theory. Weiss emphasizes how this non-political 
and technical approach to international cooperation underscores the potential for small 
collaborative steps to evolve into larger arrangements of coordination.99 Further, Weiss 
highlights how this ability to foster confidence and competencies between states enables “the 
thornier and tougher tasks of international peace and security [to] be tackled with greater 
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likelihood of success,” which some believed to be so great that war could someday be rendered 
impossible.100 
 Building from functionalism, the subsequent theory of neofunctionalism emerged in 1958 
with Ernst B. Haas’ book The Uniting of Europe. Although this work was primarily concerned 
with European regional integration in particular, optimistic about the ascendancy of 
supranationalism, and prone to retrospective self-critiquing, one of neofunctionalism’s main 
components is consequential in analyzing inter-state cooperation, as well. An important element 
of Haas’ theory is that cooperation between states in one sector facilitates integration in other 
policy areas, which illustrates the exponential potential of collaboration.101 In effect, this 
‘spillover effect’ posited that coordination in one functional area would most definitely spread to 
others. This neofunctional concept—in conjunction with foundational functional notions—is 
critical in understanding how cooperation breeds further cooperation between states. In analyzing 
the history of UAE-Israel relations, these theoretical ideas help explain how initial need-based, 
common interests and first contacts in the 1970s evolved into diverse, increasingly collaborative, 
and expansive ties by the time the two states decided to formalize their relations in 2020. 
 
Tacit Security Regime 
 As opposed to communication theory and the frameworks of functionalism and 
neofunctionalism, the concept of a ‘tacit security regime’ is a much more recent and evolving 
concept. In their detailed study of Israel’s relations with the Gulf states, Clive Jones and Yoel 
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Guzansky provide a comprehensive overview of the literature on tacit security regimes on which 
they center their book, especially within the context of Israel’s relations in the Middle East.  
Rooted in the realist logic of the security dilemma, the notion of a ‘security regime’ 
combines the dominance of hard power considerations with the ability for states to pursue other 
compatible interests.102 While Robert Jervis contends that security regimes are based on 
“principles, rules and norms that [engender] mutual reciprocity and restraint,” Janice Gross Stein 
applied this reasoning to the Middle East in particular, concluding that the states in the Arab-
Israeli conflict “recognised the rules of a game and the underlying principle of reciprocity 
involved.”103 Jones and Guzansky ultimately disapprove of Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler’s 
construct of a ‘laissez faire security regime’ between Israel and its Arab neighbors, as its focus 
on deterrence overshadows the consideration of the interactions between states.104 However, 
Aharon Klieman’s work on Israel and Jordan’s pre-treaty relations offers a robust framework for 
evaluating the tacit security regime in particular. In developing the concept of a tacit security 
regime (TSR), Klieman describes it as a regime of “non-superpower, non-hegemonic, non-
Western, non-contractual and non-institutionalised cooperation.”105 Advancing three key features 
of a TSR, Klieman concludes that national security exists as the primary goal of the regime, 
although other interests can be pursued, with both competition and cooperation concurrently 
transpiring in other realms.  
In their 2019 book Fraternal Enemies, Jones and Guzansky apply Klieman’s TSR 
framework to the relations between Israel and the Gulf states in particular, acknowledging that 
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these interactions and arrangements are much more overt and diverse than those considered by 
Klieman in analyzing Israel-Jordan ties. In doing so, Jones and Guzansky outline their own 
paradigm for a TSR that reflects the relations between Israel and the Gulf monarchies:106 
1. Geographical distance does not necessarily determine the scope and intensity of exchange 
between the actors. 
2. The regime exists as a function of shared perception of threat (Iran), instead of a way for 
states to manage their relations with each other. 
3. The actors in the TSR recognize ideational and emotive elements based on domestic 
legitimacy, which prevents more progressive ties. 
4. The regime’s intimacy indicates subjective perceptions about Great Power commitment 
to the actors’ security, especially by the United States. 
5. The TSR is not defined by other exchanges between actors, such as those in business and 
commerce; these diverse ties can instead be viewed as the use of Israel’s soft power for 
the purpose of hard diplomatic gain. 
6. The regime is dynamic and can evolve with ideational changes, as the regime allows for 
overt yet subtle signals that can impact public acceptance of more progressive dialogue 
and other strategic and political exchanges. 
 
Jones and Guzansky contend that their model of a TSR is a valuable tool to understand relations 
between Israel and the Gulf states, as “it allows security co-operation to be pursued between the 
actors involved (most notably over Iran) but without compromising sensitive political positions 
that might give rise to internal opposition.”107 The authors identify three fundamental sources of 
shared security concerns between Israel and the Gulf that command the scope and composition 
of the connections within the regime: Iran’s increasing regional ambitions, the growth of non-
state armed groups, and mutual anxiety over the role of the US in the region.108  
 Although they hail the TSR as a valuable paradigm to understand the relations between 
Israel and the Gulf states, Jones and Guzansky limit its potential to develop into full 
normalization. Rather, they contend that the main purpose of the TSR is that it “allowed the Gulf 
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monarchies . . . to enjoy the advantages of dealing with Israel without having to pay the price in 
terms of a febrile domestic base or wiser regional challenges to their legitimacy.”109 In this sense, 
Jones and Guzansky were quite pessimistic about the prospect of this existing arrangement 
progressing into anything formal and denied that any of these states has any substantial incentive 
to pursue full normalization. Acknowledging the merit of the TSR in providing a template for 
assessing regional shifts in terms of alliances and security systems in general, Jones and 
Guzansky reinforce that “the TSR is a framework—not a linear process—to meet a defined end,” 
which they identify as the containment of Iran.110 This assertion—which was published a year 
before the Abraham Accords materialized—effectively rejects both the possibility of full 
normalization as well as the TSR’s utility in achieving it. In retrospect, it is easy to point out that 
this reasoning was erroneous for positing that there is neither any desire nor potential among the 
actors to pursue official ties.111 Consequently, in recognizing the success of the Abraham 
Accords, it is ultimately useful to consider the TSR’s utility as a prospective strategy for states 
who aim to eventually establish formal normalization in the name of a common security interest.   
 
Conclusion 
Together, these three models—communication theory, functionalism, and the TSR—
provide a theoretical basis for understanding the UAE and Israel’s pre-Accords normalization. 
These frameworks not only explain how states can pursue cooperation but also how states can 
interact to achieve more collaborative, stable, and normal relations. Further, the literature 
reinforces the notion that normalization is a strategic process that builds trust, respect, and 
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cooperation between states before, during, and after a peace agreement, providing valuable 
theoretical support for the utility of pre-Accords normalization to facilitate official ties between 
the UAE and Israel.  
Although Jones and Guzansky reject the TSR’s ability to evolve into official 
normalization, I contend that the TSR is a valuable factor that led to the Abraham Accords. 
Together with three fundamental elements—the regional security landscape, the role of the 
United States as a broker, and the consideration of the Palestinians—the TSR is an essential, 
foundational component of the decision for Israel and the UAE to officially normalize relations. 
In combining the merits of each of these theories and frameworks, I will now advance a new 
theory to explain why official normalization between the UAE and Israel materialized in August 
2020.  
 35 
A Theory to Explain the Official Normalization Between Israel and the UAE 
Before I outline a theory to explain the official normalization between Israel and the 
UAE, it is important to clarify what ‘official normalization’ entails. Drawing from the work of 
Hitman and Kertcher, I have demonstrated that normalization is an ongoing process between two 
states to resolve conflict and improve relations. In particular, I have established that 
normalization can occur before, during, and after a peace settlement. Terms such as ‘official,’ 
‘formal,’ and ‘full’ normalization refer to this ‘during’ period of normalization, which manifests 
in an agreement to officially normalize relations. In the case of the UAE and Israel, the Abraham 
Accords represent this ‘official normalization,’ which effectively codified and formalized the 
normalization efforts of tacit cooperation that preceded the agreement. 
The following explanation for the Abraham Accords is twofold. First, the TSR of 
cooperation and pre-Accords normalization between the UAE and Israel laid the crucial 
foundation conducive to a formal agreement. Second, three essential factors—the regional 
security environment, the role of the United States, and the Palestinian situation—converged 
during the summer of 2020, which presented a propitious opportunity to capitalize on the 
benefits of official normalization. In this section, I outline the logic and structure of this theory, 
which will be followed by a discussion of the empirical evidence that tests and underpins the 
theory. 
 
1. The Tacit Security Regime 
 Israel and the UAE have an extensive history of informal, secret ties, which have 
increasingly developed into much more diverse, overt links in recent years. As described by 
Jones and Guzansky, these longstanding connections between the UAE and Israel constitute a 
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TSR—an arrangement that enables security cooperation without jeopardizing delicate political 
considerations and provoking domestic opposition.112 This dynamic not only allowed each state 
to reap the benefits of cooperation while avoiding internal and regional criticism, but the TSR 
also ultimately enabled both states to envision and embrace full normalization. As explained by 
the theories of communication and functionalism, these links effectively increased and 
strengthened the bilateral respect, stability, and confidence between the UAE and Israel.113 This 
phenomenon is echoed by Hitman and Kertcher, who affirm that normalization is an ongoing 
process that can begin occurring before a peace agreement has been reached, which not only 
fosters trust and mutual interests but also increases the chances of successfully negotiating peace 
agreements.114  
 As opposed to Jones and Guzansky’s shortsighted assertion that the TSR is simply a 
paradigm with which to analyze the relations between the UAE and Israel, the Emirati-Israeli 
TSR has proven its utility in evolving into fully normalized relations. After all, Jones and 
Guzansky’s pessimism about an imminent normalization agreement does not preclude the TSR’s 
ability to cultivate deeper cooperation. With its focus on security threats and strategic interests, 
Jones and Guzansky posit that the TSR’s prioritization of security matters “[carries] the potential 
to instigate broader collaboration over the coming years.”115 Hence, the TSR is a crucial 
facilitator and vital component of the Abraham Accords. Without these foundational links 
between the UAE and Israel, these leaders stuck in an intractable conflict would have continued 
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to view the situation as a zero-sum game in which the costs of official normalization are greater 
than remaining in conflict. Yet, by pursuing a deliberate strategy of normalization prior to a 
formal treaty, the UAE and Israel were able to shift the cost-benefit balance so that the status quo 
became increasingly costly and formal relations became increasingly advantageous. In essence, 
the pre-Accords normalization efforts, as signified by the TSR, were a successful conflict 
resolution tactic in achieving official normalization between Israel and the UAE. Although the 
subsequent three factors more concisely pinpoint the timing of the Abraham Accords, the 
evolution of the TSR into more covert and deep ties by 2020 effectively put Israel and the UAE 
on the verge of full normalization and in a position in which both sides were able to pursue an 
agreement to formalize their tacit cooperation.  
 
2. The Three Factors 
 Three fundamental factors more precisely explain the timing and conditions under which 
normalization was formalized between the UAE and Israel in August 2020. First, changes in the 
international and regional security landscape prompted a shift from tacit to formal cooperation. 
Second, the role of the United States as an international broker and the fear of mutual loss also 
drove the UAE and Israel to formalize normal relations in a bilateral agreement. Third—and 
perhaps the most consequential in regards to the exact timing of the Accords—the management 
and consideration of the Palestinians largely precipitated the decision to officially normalize ties. 
 
1. The Security Landscape 
 As explained in their analysis of Israel-Gulf relations, Jones and Guzansky emphasize the 
principal function of tacit cooperation as being predicated on shared security threats and strategic 
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interests—particularly the containment of Iran.116 Although Iran promptly termed the agreement 
as “a strategic act of idiocy,” the confluence of Emirati and Israeli concerns about Iranian 
expansionism and aggression in the region aptly justify their move towards closer cooperation.117 
It is important to note that the bulk of the non-military agreement focuses on collaboration in 
non-military realms, and the only concrete security measure explicitly described in the Accords 
is the vague plan to develop a ‘Strategic Agenda for the Middle East’ to “advance the cause of 
peace, stability and prosperity” in the region.118 However, in the words of one analyst, “despite 
the narrative of ‘peace’ around the Abraham Accords, it is not to be forgotten that the harbinger 
of this accord is deterrence—both political and military—against Iran.”119 
 In addition to mutual concerns about expansionist Turkey and non-state adversaries in the 
region, the escalation of the threat of Iran by the summer of 2020 was consequential in 
facilitating Emirati and Israeli moves towards full normalization. While the Accords were by no 
means a military alliance, emphasis on Israel and the UAE’s buildup of a “counterrevolutionary 
bloc” against both the Qatar-Turkey axis and Iran’s network of regional proxies and allies 
demonstrates the Accords’ effectiveness in shifting the regional balance of power.120 Regardless 
of the content of the treaty—which primarily focuses on other realms of cooperation—the 
Accords were largely the result of converging and escalating security threats and the increasing 
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impetus for the UAE and Israel to effectively counter Iran’s aggression and nuclear ambitions in 
the region. 
  
2. The United States as a Broker and Valuable Ally 
 Reviving its traditional role as a broker in the Middle East, the United States 
demonstrated not only its utility as a credible and balanced mediator in facilitating the Abraham 
Accords but also as a dominant player in the Arab-Israeli conflict and Middle East as a whole. 
Despite American efforts to retrench its direct activity in the region, the US has continued to 
assert its authority and promote its interests, especially through allied governments such as the 
UAE and Israel.121 These two countries, in return, consistently aim to curry favor with the US, 
which has not only brought the UAE and Israel closer in cooperation throughout the years but 
also incentivized both countries with the prospect of stronger relations with the US and greater 
American support in the region.122 
 The United States demonstrated its leverage and influence as a valuable ally in the region 
in two important ways. First, despite American commitments to upholding Israel’s Qualitative 
Military Edge, the US agreed to sell F-35 jets and other advanced military equipment to the 
UAE, indicating America’s interest in strengthening the burgeoning Emirati and Israeli axis 
against Iran and its proxies.123 In addition to this strategic inducement, the US exemplified its 
role as a key player and partner in the Middle East through its efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions. With Iran’s flouting of the abandoned Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
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and increasingly defiant pursuit of nuclear capabilities, the President Trump not only had an 
incentive to finalize the official normalization between the UAE and Israel to solidify its 
partnership against the threat of Iran, but the US also confirmed its growing need to remain close 
to Israel and the UAE to manage Iran’s nuclear aspirations.124 Both Israel and the UAE have 
downplayed the extent to which the US might have played an active role in orchestrating the 
Abraham Accords; however, the US as a dominant force fostered a dynamic between the three 
states favorable to a successful normalization agreement, and the US’ historic role in the region 
has not only brought the UAE and Israel closer together but also prompted other states to follow 
in normalizing relations with Israel. 
 
3. Annexation and the Palestinian Question 
 While both the changing security landscape and the role of the United States created a 
dynamic between the UAE and Israel ripe for a formal agreement normalizing relations, the 
politics of the Palestinian cause and the proposed Israeli annexation of the West Bank ultimately 
propelled the Emiratis and Israelis to pursue full normalization in August 2020. It would 
erroneous to downplay the role and significance of the Palestinian issue in the formation of the 
Abraham Accords. After all, the Arab Peace Initiative has remained the presumed framework 
with which Arab states could seek official normalization with Israel since 2002, and a 
comprehensive settlement to the Palestinian situation was assumed to be the only explicit 
obstacle to normalization.125 In fact, with the exceptions of Egypt and Jordan who evaded this 
 
124 Kabir Taneja, “The Abrahamic Middle East — Will Israeli-Arab Alignment on Iran Create a New Equilibrium 
for Peace?” Observer Research Foundation, December 28, 2020. 
125 Gil Murciano, “The Abraham Accords: An Invitation to Rethink the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, October 8, 2020. 
 41 
precondition in their peace treaties with Israel, the Arab commitment to prioritizing the 
Palestinian cause above all else has endured since before Israel’s creation in 1948. 
 The Palestinian issue has long been embraced by the cause of Pan-Arabism, which grew 
from nineteenth century European nationalist ideas, anti-colonialism, and the Arab desire to 
rebuild what was lost.126 Arab allegiance to the Palestinian cause has persisted for decades, with 
one Foreign Affairs article from 1938 describing how the Arabs in Palestine used the “weapons” 
of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism in their opposition to the Jewish population.127 In his article, 
Robert Gale Woolbert described the how the Palestinian issue emerged as part of Pan-Arabism: 
“The dominant political tactic of the Arabs in Palestine, led by the Grand Mufti, has been 
to arouse the sympathy and, if possible, obtain the active assistance of the Arabs and 
Moslems everywhere. In short, His Eminence has tried to lift the Palestine question from 
its local setting and make it a Pan Arab and Pan Islamic problem.”128 
 
Woolbert’s account of the 1937 Pan Arab Congress further demonstrates the longevity and 
strength of this historic link, with its resolution that “Palestine is Arab and its preservation as 
such is the duty of every Arab.”129 Elisheva Rosman-Stollman, meanwhile, illustrates a more 
complex account of Pan-Arabism in the Gulf states. Before their independence in 1971, the Gulf 
states were simply required by the Arab League to monetarily support the Palestinians and cast 
anti-Israel votes, maintaining a hostility against Israel to placate their large Palestinian non-
citizen minorities, assert independence from Iran, and conform with regional sentiment.130 All 
while maintaining covert ties to Israel, the Gulf states only provided anti-Israel statements and 
inconsistent economic sanctions until 1991, when the Gulf War and First Intifada led the Gulf 
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states to champion and promote the Palestinian cause.131 However, the fact that the Gulf states 
took advantage of the 1993 Oslo Accords to eliminate secondary and tertiary boycotts on Israel 
demonstrates their imperfect allegiance to the Palestinians, as well as their growing secret 
connections with Israel.132 
 Regardless of the Gulf monarchies’ wavering embrace of the Palestinian cause, the 
Gulf’s persisting commitment to the Pan-Arab movement’s promotion of Palestinian rights and 
statehood and its efficacy in preventing Arab-Israeli normalization are significant. Hence, it is 
important to emphasize the political value that the Palestinians have continued to hold, especially 
in the force of Pan-Arabism in the Middle East—even if the prioritization of their movement on 
the regional agenda has dwindled in recent years. In his provocatively titled article “Why Do the 
Arabs Hate the Palestinians?” Mordechai Kedar summarizes this view, explaining that the Arab 
world “does not appreciate the expectation that it must mortgage its future and its very existence 
to the internal fighting between the PLO and Hamas.”133 Although this analysis is not shared by 
the majority of Arabs in the region who remain committed to the Palestinians—including the 
UAE—it does highlight the declining preeminence of the Pan-Arab hold over Arab-Israeli 
affairs. A 2019 public opinion survey published by The Jordan Times revealed that majorities in 
most Arab nations think that normalization with Israel “may be a good thing,” citing frustration, 
fatigue from Palestinians’ victim complex, and the potential for normalization to provide 
economic benefits and leverage for Arab states to gain concessions from Israel to the 
Palestinians.134 While this data demonstrates a significant shift in public opinion about the 
Palestinian cause—indicating a lesser prioritization of the Palestinians within the Arab world—
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this survey also emphasizes the emerging justification for normalization with Israel—that it 
paradoxically has the possibility of furthering the Palestinian cause. 
 While Arabs in the Middle East are increasingly prioritizing domestic issues over the 
Palestinians, Pan-Arabism continues to inhibit Arab-Israeli rapprochement with its hold over the 
Palestinian issue. This persisting difficulty for Arab states to break free from Pan-Arabism’s 
tradition of “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it” can be 
explained by the theory of path dependence.135 Political scientist Margaret Levi narrowly defines 
path dependence, explaining that “once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of 
reversal are very high.”136 Hence, Levi contends that despite other choices, “the entrenchments 
of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.”137 Paul 
Pierson combines this definition with economics to describe path dependence as “social 
processes that exhibit increasing returns.”138 In effect, Pierson emphasizes not only that inertia 
will prevent change but also that timing and sequencing is critical in changing policy.139 By 
incorporating morphogenetic social theory, Ian Greener instead advances his own hypothesis that 
after a policy is implemented, a subsequent period of reproduction emerges in which the policy 
or institution must generate feedback mechanisms that create inertia, or possibly even increasing 
returns, to ‘lock out’ competing political ideas and vested interests.”140 Therefore, the 
establishment of a path-dependent policy will create an inertial force in which vested and cultural 
interests will have a high opportunity cost for changing the policy. 
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 Echoing the aforementioned work of Zartman, LeoGrande, and Kingdon, the idea of path 
dependence emphasizes the challenge for political actors to reverse or alter existing policies, 
particularly when there is a perceived high cost for abandoning the status quo. The Pan-Arab 
commitment to the Palestinian cause—despite the recent decline of its prioritization in the 
region—represents a path-dependent policy that has been so entrenched in Middle East politics 
that it is difficult to change. This challenge accounts for much of the hesitance for Arab states to 
officially normalize relations with Israel. A specific example of this path dependence is the Arab 
Peace Initiative, which for eighteen years remained the prevailing framework under which Arab-
Israeli rapprochement could transpire. Yet, with the opportunity provided by Israel’s plan for 
annexation of the West Bank in 2020—a situation the UAE was able to manipulate to justify 
normalization with its proclaimed dedication to the Palestinian cause—the summer of 2020 
became an ideal time for Israel and the UAE to pursue full normalization, especially with the 
shifting security environment and the US’ participation as a broker and ally. In essence, with the 
endurance of the Palestinian question continually promoted and upheld by Pan-Arab sentiment, 
the UAE and Israel developed a creative policy solution to path dependence, provided by the 
debate over annexation leading up to the Abraham Accords. 
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Empirical Evidence 
1. Tacit Security Regime 
In order to determine how the Accords came to be, it is crucial to understand the extent, 
depth, and evolution of Emirati-Israeli relations, especially in the context of a TSR that 
emphasizes the primacy of security interests. Since its formation in 1971, the UAE has 
maintained informal ties with Israel that comprise a longstanding process of normalization, 
which facilitated and culminated in the 2020 Abraham Accords. These connections have 
manifested in the realms of security and intelligence, business and trade, diplomacy, regional 
cooperation, and culture. 
 
Security and Intelligence 
 Israel and the UAE’s long tradition of discreet ties first emerged from early intelligence 
contacts in the 1970s, since which each Israeli head of intelligence has maintained relationships 
with its Emirati counterpart.141 These initial security connections soon expanded to the 
commercial sector, as many Israeli intelligence officials began establishing covert business 
relations with the UAE in the security industry after their service.142 While the contracts between 
remain secret, the existence of the UAE and Israel’s historic weapons trade is well-known, and 
some evidence of security and intelligence cooperation has come to light over the past decade.143 
Business dealings between Israeli firms and the Critical National Infrastructure Authority (which 
manages Emirati military and security affairs), for example, were revealed to have dated back to 
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2007, in which Israeli businessman Mati Kochavi, owner of Swiss-registered company AGT, 
sold an alleged $800 million worth of security equipment to the UAE for surveillance of strategic 
oil fields and infrastructure.144 These security and intelligence links were likely driven by 
overlapping security interests just as much as the economic ambitions of individual companies, 
businesspeople, and stakeholders. Moreover, a cable uncovered by Wikileaks in 2010 revealed 
that Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah Ibn Zayeed 
maintained a “good and personal relationship” with “secret and persistent dialogue.”145 Although 
Israeli-Emirati relations soured earlier that year following the Mossad’s alleged assassination of 
Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai, this interlude was short-lived and was even used 
as leverage for Israel to well weapons technology to the UAE.146  
At this point, Israeli-Emirati collaboration was becoming more evident, with the UAE 
launching their Falcon Eye surveillance system with blatant ties to Israeli intelligence in 2016 
and the two countries participating in multinational air force exercises together in 2017.147 Amid 
the growing shared threat of Iran in the region, Emirati officials were also becoming more vocal 
about their support for and the benefits of security ties with Israel. In a series of tweets in 2016, 
Lieutenant General Dahi Khalfan Tamim, head of security for the Dubai Emirate, asked his 
followers not to “treat Jews as enemies,” likely referring to Iran in insisting that “rapprochement 
will solve problems. Why shouldn’t we have a coalition with the Jews against the enemies of the 
Middle East?”148 Widely viewed as a harbinger for the Accords, an op-ed written by UAE 
Ambassador to the US Yousef Al Otaiba for an Israeli newspaper earlier in 2020 emphasized the 
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advantages of closer security cooperation that could be possible should Israel abandon its plans 
for annexation.149 “With the region’s two most capable militaries, common concerns about 
terrorism and aggression, and a deep and long relationship with the United States, the UAE and 
Israel could form closer and more effective security cooperation . . . We face too many common 
dangers and see the great potential of warmer ties,” Al Otaiba explained.150 Amid their mutual 
perceived threat of Iran, the UAE and Israel have already begun capitalizing on their normalized 
security and intelligence relations in the months following the Accords. 
 
Business and Trade 
 Although the Arab League has technically sustained a boycott against Israel since 1951, 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) opted to end its secondary and tertiary boycotts on Israel 
following the Oslo Accords in 1994, opening their countries to Israeli markets.151 Along with the 
desire to attain untapped profits, the UAE and Israel also pursued economic ties due to the 
initiative of private individuals and organizations aiming to improve relations between the two 
countries.152 These covert economic connections began to proliferate in the 1990s, with business 
executives such as Jon Medved using foreign passports to conclude deals in the UAE.153 The 
lucrative diamond industry, for example, has historically taken advantage of third countries for 
the UAE and Israel to furtively conduct trade.154 In addition to these considerable back-channel 
dealings, the UAE imported $138.4 million worth of Israeli goods between 2008 and 2013, with 
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Israel exporting $5.3 million worth of goods and services to the UAE in 2013 alone.155 While 
collaboration and joint ventures between Emirati and Israeli port enterprises date back to the 
early 2000s, a recent investment of $15 billion by an Emirati sovereign wealth fund in Israeli 
entrepreneur’s WeWork company indicates that economic ties between the two countries have 
only burgeoned in recent years.156 By officially normalizing relations, the UAE and Israel have 
“[actualized] immense economic and business potential,” with Israeli exports estimated to grow 
to $300-350 million annually and the newly established Abraham Fund pooling more than $3 
billion from the US, UAE, and Israel to promote regional prosperity and coordination.157 
 
Diplomacy 
 The 1991 Madrid Conference’s peacemaking efforts between Israel and the Palestinians 
effectively marked the “beginning of a process of normalization” in the realm of diplomacy, as 
the Gulf States began pursuing more diplomatic collaboration with Israel, especially following 
the Oslo Accords in 1993.158 Soon enough, Jeremy Issacharoff in 1994 became the first Israeli 
diplomat to meet an Emirati official to discuss Emirati military interests.159 That same year, such 
diplomatic discourse was further facilitated by the establishment of the Emirates Center for 
Strategic Studies and Research, a government-backed think tank used as a vessel for contacts 
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with Israel.160 By the early 2000s under George W. Bush’s presidency, Israeli officials 
participated in secret hotel room meetings in Washington, D.C. with the UAE’s Ambassador to 
the US, Yousef Al Otaiba, which continued through President Barack Obama’s administration.161 
In 2009, Israel supported the headquarters of the UN International Renewable Energy 
Association (IRENA) being located in Abu Dhabi, portending its function as a means for 
communication between the two countries.162 Following the visit of two Israeli officials to the 
office three months earlier, Israeli Minister of Infrastructure Uzi Landau’s attendance at the 
IRENA conference in 2010 was the first official visit of an Israeli minister to the UAE, and a 
permanent Israeli representative has remained at the IRENA headquarters since 2015.163 
 Both informal and overt diplomatic ties between Israel and the UAE have expanded in 
recent years. In 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly met with senior 
UAE leaders in Cyprus to discuss their shared dissatisfaction with the Iran deal, and Israel’s UN 
ambassador Danny Danon visited Dubai for further discussions about Iran a year later.164 In 
2019, Netanyahu met with senior Arab officials and foreign ministers and even posed for photos 
with them at the Warsaw Summit.165 And, in recent years Emirati-Israeli relations have also 
increasingly become more apparent, with decades of diplomatic work by delegations of Jewish 
American leaders becoming public knowledge.166 As American Jewish Committee leader and 
 
160 Linah Alsaafin, “How Did Israel and the UAE Get to Normalising Relations?” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera Media 
Network, August 14, 2020.  
161 Steve Hendrix, “Inside the Secret-Not-Secret Courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates.” 
162 Daniel Wagner and Giorgio Cafiero, “What Does Israel Want With the UAE?” The National Interest, The Center 
for the National Interest, January 5, 2016. 
163 Yoel Guzansky, “Israel and the Arab Gulf States: From Tacit Cooperation to Reconciliation?” Israel Affairs 21 
(2015): pp. 131-147; Jonathan H. Ferziger and Gawdat Bahgat, Israel’s Growing Ties with the Gulf Arab States, 
Atlantic Council, July 2020. 
164 Adam Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order,” The New Yorker no. June 18, 2018, June 11, 2018; Steve 
Hendrix, “Inside the Secret-Not-Secret Courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates.” 
165 Jonathan H. Ferziger and Gawdat Bahgat, Israel’s Growing Ties with the Gulf Arab States. 
166 Alex Traiman, “U.S. Jewish Leaders See Ally in Emirates,” The Jewish Star, February 22, 2018. 
 50 
longtime delegate to the UAE Jason Isaacson explains, such private diplomacy is crucial, as it 
“[builds] trust, [proves] that the promise of benefits can be realized, and [builds] momentum for 
peace and cooperation.”167 Israel and the UAE have already begun to reap the benefits of normal 
relations, with plans to establish embassies and exchange ambassadors and countless diplomatic 
meetings within months of the Accords.168 
 
Regional Cooperation 
 As opposed to the long history of covert cooperation in the realms of security, economy, 
and diplomacy, Israeli-Emirati collaboration in regional initiatives is a more recent phenomenon. 
The Gulf states have only been secretly working with Israel in addressing regional water scarcity 
since the 1990s, while healthcare has become a promising sector for further partnership in recent 
years, with Israeli hospitals as a destination of medical tourism by prominent Gulf patients.169 In 
2019, Dr. Yitshak Kreiss, director-general of the Sheba Medical Center in Israel, attended the 
Peace to Prosperity Workshop in Bahrain where he discussed with Gulf officials the prospect of 
establishing medical ties; by June 2020 it was announced that the UAE and Israel had been 
cooperating in researching the coronavirus pandemic.170  
Other regional efforts have included collaboration in desert agriculture, energy sources, 
other areas of scientific research, and even a proposed regional train network.171 Using Israel as a 
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land bridge to connect the port of Haifa to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the project—unveiled 
during a visit to the UAE by Israeli Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz—aims to promote regional 
trade and peace.172 In detailing the history and prospects for normalization between Israel and 
Arab countries, scholars Gadi Hitman and Chen Kertcher conclude that “the fact that both sides 
share common goals involving the development of new energy, water, and agricultural 
technology” has largely made this expansion of collaboration in recent years possible.173  
 
Culture 
 An even more nascent and public area of cooperation between the UAE and Israel has 
been in cultural overtures, which have been essential in acclimating each society to closer ties 
and developing genuine connections as a foundation for normalization. In 2018, former Israeli 
Minister of Culture and Sports Miri Regev attended a judo competition in Abu Dhabi, which was 
the first time an Israeli delegation participated under its national flag and the Israeli national 
anthem was played in the UAE.174 Sports have continued to become a propitious sector for 
cultural integration in the Gulf, with Israel invited to participate in the 2020 UAE Tour, as well 
as the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar.175 Perhaps the most remarkable overture thus far has been 
Israel’s invitation to attend the Dubai Expo (now postponed to 2021), in which Israel will be able 
to showcase its innovations in science and technology to a global audience in the UAE.176 
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 The UAE and Israel have also actively been promoting religious acceptance and 
integration in recent years, which tourism has the potential to further expand, especially with 
Muslim visitors to sacred sites in Jerusalem.177 Historically, 850,000 Jewish refugees have been 
expelled from the region’s Arab countries over the past six decades; Jews continue to be refused 
entry to the Gulf states and many Arab states, and surely anti-Semitic sentiment still remains in 
these countries.178 However, since its creation in 1971, a small Jewish community has remained 
in the UAE, which the country has made substantial efforts to support.179 Not only is the UAE 
now home to two synagogues and a recognized Chief Rabbi of the Jewish Community of the 
Emirates, but kosher food has also been made more accessible in the country.180 Meanwhile, in 
2019, the UAE announced the construction of an interfaith complex in Abu Dhabi.181 Consisting 
of a church, mosque, and synagogue, the Abrahamic Family House aims to promote the 
acceptance of and peace between the three Abrahamic faiths—an omen of the sentiment behind 
the name of the Abraham Accords signed just a year later. 
____________________ 
The record of tacit cooperation between the UAE and Israel in the realms of security and 
intelligence, business and trade, diplomacy, regional cooperation, and culture constitute a TSR: 
an arrangement that permits collaboration on shared security interests while avoiding the 
incitement of political sensitivities. As outlined above, the increasingly public and extensive 
nature of collaboration between the UAE and Israel not only reached its zenith in 2020—with 
government officials and leaders openly visiting and meeting—but also received little vocal 
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denunciation within the region. Granted, it is important to note that Israel’s similar relations with 
the other Gulf states account for some of the silence in the region, but this growing acceptance of 
Israel within the Arab world and unlikelihood that criticism and punishment would be a 
consequence of a formal agreement were significant impacts on the timing of the Accords. In 
effect, the TSR was a crucial normalization strategy used by both states to officially resolve their 
conflict and eventually capitalize on the benefits of normal relations, and the apogee of this tacit 
cooperation reached in 2020 substantiates the approximate timing of the Abraham Accords in 
August 2020. Consequently, the high level of cooperation within the TSR by the summer of 
2020 put the UAE and Israel on the verge of official normalization, though the following three 
factors were instrumental in pushing Israel and the UAE to pursue a formal agreement. 
 
2. The Three Factors 
 The convergence of three conditions enabled the inception of the Abraham Accords in 
August 2020: changes in the security environment, America’s role as a mediator and strategic 
ally, and the opportunity of annexation to circumvent the Palestinian issue. 
 
1. The Security Landscape 
Although Iran’s relationship with the UAE is less hostile than that of with Israel, the 
increasing threat of the UAE’s neighbor across the Gulf is sizable enough to warrant such a 
strategic move with Israel. After all, much of the UAE’s strategy and doctrine stems from the 
security interests of the GCC, which, since its establishment in 1981, has worked to 
counterbalance the belligerent Iranian regime.182 Today, the UAE and Iran continue to compete 
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for hegemony and power in the region, and this tension has been augmented by Emirati military 
collaboration with Saudi Arabia, especially during the conflict in Yemen.183 Further, the 
decades-long territorial dispute between the UAE and Iran over Abu Masa, Greater Tunb, and 
Lesser Tunb remains a significant source of friction between the two states, as the control of 
these islands proffers strategic control of maritime traffic in the Gulf, with approximately forty 
percent of global oil production passing through the Strait of Hormuz each day.184 However, Iran 
is a direct security threat with its entire ballistic and cruise missile arsenal within striking range 
of the UAE and its strategic assets, as well as its role as an active proliferator and supplier to 
proxy groups in the region.185 And although the UAE became the first Arab nation to open a 
nuclear power plant in August 2020, the UAE remains watchful of Iran’s nuclear proliferation 
activities, especially with Iranian’s increasing defiance of the disintegrating 2015 Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).186 
 Israel, on the other hand, faces a much more antagonistic and less amenable adversary 
with Iran. Remarkably, Iran initially shared strategic and cordial relations with Israel and became 
the second Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1950.187 Yet, these relations quickly 
deteriorated with the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and installation of a new oppressive, theocratic 
regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini, who promptly embraced the Palestinian cause, denounced 
Israel as the “Little Satan,” and severed relations with Israel three weeks later.188 Despite 
instances of cooperation during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iran has remained committed to 
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the destruction of Israel, brandishing in 2019 their “capacity to destroy the impostor Zionist 
regime” and that this endeavor is now an “achievable goal.”189 In the words of analyst Ali Vaez, 
the Iranian-Israeli conflict has become “a screw that only turns in one direction, getting tenser 
and tenser over time,” and by 2019 both states have made explicit remarks about their defense 
capabilities and military preparedness with the possibility of direct conflict.190 In particular, the 
JCPOA has remained a predominant source of tension between Israel and Iran, especially with 
recent efforts by Iran to expand its nuclear program. While Israel prefers a confrontational 
approach of political pressure, economic sanctions, and the use of force to address Iran’s 
proliferation, the UAE opts for limited pressure and diplomacy to manage this critical threat.191  
Meanwhile, Israeli and Emirati security interests also overlap in regards to containing 
Iran’s entrenchment and countering Iran’s proxy groups in the region. Over the last five years, 
Iran has maintained the ‘balance of effective force’—capabilities most readily deployable with 
the largest advantage in an actual conflict—due to its unique capacity to fight through third 
parties in the region.192 Throughout the past four decades, Iran has supported its partners and 
proxies in all of Israel’s major military conflicts, supplying personnel, materiel, and money to 
three of Israel’s borders—Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian territories.193 Not only did Iran 
directly develop Hezbollah as an anti-Israel, pro-Iran militant group in the 1980s that has since 
remained a constant threat to Israel, but Iran also supports Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in 
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Yemen—all of which the UAE condemns or actively fights against.194 The UAE’s central efforts 
to counter the extremism of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda, and ISIS also align with the 
strategic interests of Israel, who remains an enemy of these terrorist groups.195 Another 
significant source of shared security concern is Turkey, which—with its increasingly revisionist 
and expansionist policies throughout the region—continues to pursue aggressive and coercive 
measures against the UAE and Israel alike.196 
 Several key events leading up to the Abraham Accords in August 2020 exacerbated 
regional tensions, thus providing a stronger impetus for the strategic alignment of Israel and the 
UAE, as well as the formation of an axis against Iran in the region. In fact, the year 2020 began 
with the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani—the most powerful military commander 
leading Iran’s Quds Force—which was carried out by a US air strike and supported with 
valuable Israeli intelligence, the public knowledge of which prompted threats of targeting Tel 
Aviv and Haifa to avenge Soleimani’s death.197 Friction continued to increase as Iran sustained 
the expansion of its nuclear proliferation efforts throughout the year, launching its first military 
satellite on April 22.198 Another US-Israel collaboration in the killing of al-Qaeda’s ‘Number 2’ 
Abu Mohammed al-Masri in Iran on August 7—just six days before the Abraham Accords were 
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announced—exemplifies the augmenting tension in the region as well as the anti-Iran camp’s 
increasing momentum to take substantial action against Iran and its proxies.199 The US’ 
“maximum pressure” foreign policy strategy against Iran throughout 2020 largely aggravated 
this regional hostility, much due to the Trump administration’s extensive campaign of sanctions 
imposed on Iranian industries, military, arms suppliers, firms, media outlets, and top officials.200 
 As analysts Tova Norlen and Tamir Sinai emphasize, “Iran’s continued support for 
regional proxies, radical groups, and terrorism, and its return to nuclear activities after the U.S. 
withdrew from the treaty, may be the most powerful factor that unites the new-found friends.”201 
Not only does this security cooperation enable overt collaboration in valuable military and 
intelligence technology, but the agreement also facilitates a consequential shift in the regional 
balance of power by solidifying an anti-Iran axis.202 Again, the Accords are not an official 
alliance with an explicit military commitment. However, this partnership effectively increases 
Israel’s presence and military capabilities in Iran’s vicinity, and the President of the Emirates 
Policy Center has gone so far as to declare that “the strategic implications of the agreement is 
nothing short of a game-changer.”203 Although the UAE emphasizes the potential of the Accords 
to engender peace, stability, and moderation in the region—even envisioning itself as a counselor 
to Turkey and a mediator between Iran and Israel—UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
Anwar Gargash conveyed that the agreement was a strategic decision that will improve the 
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UAE’s defense posture in the region.204 Ultimately, the escalation of regional tensions and 
amplification of security concerns transformed the strategic landscape in 2020 into one 
conducive to the official normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel so that the two 
states could effectively defend against Iranian, Turkish, and proxy threats throughout the region. 
 
2. The United States as a Broker and Valuable Ally 
When President Trump revealed his administration’s “Deal of the Century” aiming to 
conclusively resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, many were skeptical not only about the 
content of the plan but also about the efficacy of the United States as a mediator of a peace 
agreement.205 In fact, veteran Middle East peace negotiator Aaron David Miller described the 
plan as “a framework that may well have hung a closed-for-the-season sign both on a viable 
peace process and America’s credibility as a fair and effective broker.”206 Much of this 
apprehension emanated from the perception that President Trump and senior advisor Jared 
Kushner were turning a long-awaited resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into “the 
ultimate product of pro-Israel lawyering at its best,” abandoning their responsibility as a credible 
third party mediator to broker on behalf of both sides.207 In all three past instances of success in 
terms of negotiating peace for Israel, the US successfully represented both parties’ interests.208  
However, despite this lack of faith in America’s capacity to meditate peace in the Middle 
East, the Trump administration demonstrated its diplomatic capabilities in brokering the 
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Abraham Accords between Israel and the UAE, as well as subsequent states looking to capitalize 
on normalized relations with Israel. The success of the US’ mediation efforts can largely be 
linked to the abandonment of solely “pro-Israel brokering.”209 As Ambassador Al Otaiba 
revealed, talks about normalization first began when the UAE approached the US about their 
discontent surrounding Israel’s proposal for annexation, and his publication of an op-ed to probe 
the response to the idea of normalization effectively instigated the negotiation process.210 As 
opposed to the prospect of strictly pro-Israeli mediation of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, Al 
Otaiba reported “an incredible amount of trust” with the transactional Trump administration, 
saying that in the four weeks before the announcement, he conversed more with officials like 
Kushner and Avi Berkowitz than he did with his own family.211 Although Al Otaiba credits the 
US with much of the success of the Accords, prominent Emirati intellectual Dr. Abdulkhaleq 
Abdulla contends that the US did not pressure the UAE nor lead the decision to normalize 
relations, asserting that the UAE negotiated the agreement on its own terms and has the freedom 
to withdraw whenever it pleases.212 
Regardless of the degree to which the US played an active role in the negotiations, the 
US not only substantiated their even-handed mediation skills—as demonstrated in their 
subsequent deals between Arab nations and Israel—but also reaffirmed its role as a crucial player 
in the Middle East and indispensable ally for both Israel and the UAE. In her paper on relations 
between Israel and the Gulf states, Elisheva Rosman-Stollman argues that these actors gravitate 
towards a balancing strategy by “turning to the United States as a hegemonic yet unthreatening 
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power and using Israel as a way of currying favour with the hegemony,” which incentivized the 
Gulf states to pursue normalization.213 It is important to note that her assertion that Israel alone 
could not be an effective ally to the Gulf states was published in 2004; however, the idea that the 
Gulf states view friendly relations with Israel as a means to grow closer to the US remains a 
noteworthy dimension of US influence in the Middle East. Although the US has been slowly 
reducing its direct activity in the region, the Accords bolster its key allies and ensure their future 
support, “[providing] a lifeline for sustained U.S. influence in the region [and] strengthening 
engagement both strategically and economically.”214 Though Israel’s longstanding dependence 
on the US as an ally and protector is well-known—along with Trump and Netanyahu’s close 
relationship—the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs’ description of the US as the UAE’s 
“most important strategic ally” further signifies both countries’ continued reliance on American 
support and strength in the region.215 
 One area in which the US played an important role in facilitating the Abraham Accords is 
the selling of F-35 jets to the UAE. Notably, the US has a tradition of trading military supplies 
for peace with Israel, with Egypt acquiring the second largest military aid package in the Middle 
East in 1979 and Jordan securing debt relief and the F-16 fighter aircraft in 1994.216 In addition 
to 18 MQ-9 Reaper drones, the US also agreed to sell 50 F-35 joint strike fighter aircraft to the 
UAE.217 Not only does the US profit from this new market for military equipment—especially 
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with Chinese efforts to increase its influence in the region through commerce—but the US was 
also able to “transform the region’s strategic landscape,” in the words of then-Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo, who described the weapons deal as “recognition of our deepening relationship 
and the need for advanced defense capabilities to deter and defend itself against heightened 
threats from Iran.”218 While Israelis voiced their concern and disapproval of America’s 
circumvention of the Israel Qualitative Military Edge Act of 2017, which bans high-technology 
weapons sales to other Middle Eastern countries that would compromise Israel’s ability to 
defend itself, this criticism has largely subsided, perhaps indicating greater trust and defense 
cooperation between the new partners.219 And although President Joe Biden recently froze the 
$23 billion sale of F-35s and MQ-9s to the UAE, Ambassador Al Otaiba expressed his lack of 
concern over the freeze, calling it a “routine, checking the box exercise.”220 
 Another demonstration of the US’ dominant role in the region—as well as the UAE and 
Israel’s persisting dependence on the US as an ally—is America’s efforts to curb Iranian nuclear 
proliferation. Along with his 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA, former President Trump pursued 
a strategy of “maximum pressure” against Iran, including burgeoning sanctions, targeted 
assassinations, and hostile rhetoric.221 While this aggressive approach to Iran was supported by 
both the UAE and Israel—common ground which might have contributed to the relative ease 
with which the three leaders were able to finalize the Accords—the US continues to play a 
dominant role in the future of the JCPOA and Iran’s nuclear proliferation, regardless of President 
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Biden’s preference for more diplomatic measures.222 With Iran’s noncompliance of central 
provisions in the 2015 agreement and recent bold moves towards nuclear proliferation—along 
with Biden’s refusal to renege on its sanctions—Iran and the US are struggling to converge on 
mutual terms under which nuclear talks can resume.223 The November 2020 assassination of 
Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, top Iranian nuclear scientist, has further increased tensions between the US 
and Iran, and the UAE and Israel will need to maintain close and steady relations with the Biden 
administration to ensure that the prospects of Iranian nuclear proliferation subside and vanish.224  
 While the extent of the active involvement of the US in the negotiations is uncertain, the 
US exemplifies its indispensable role as a broker and a regional actor, both in its support of and 
imposition of its interests on the UAE and Israel. The desire for the UAE to acquire F-35 jets and 
other advanced weapons technology—as well as the convergence of concern over the increasing 
nuclear threat of Iran—created a dynamic between the three states conducive to a successful 
mediation on the part of the United States. The UAE and Israel’s historic reliance on the US and 
need for America’s strategic partnership and support not only promoted the increasing 
normalization of their relations, but this asymmetry also played a contributing role in the 
Accords themselves. Not only did the US’ participation in the Accords confer strategic 
advantages to the UAE and Israel and bring them into a closer partnership with the US, but the 
demonstration of the US as a successful broker also enabled a “domino effect” to ensue, with 
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subsequent deals with Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco further strengthening the UAE and Israel’s 
strategic position in the region.225 
 
3. Annexation and the Palestinian Question 
Prior to the Abraham Accords, Arab normalization with Israel was assumed to be 
preconditioned on a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Not only was 
this obstacle widely discussed in the academic discourse of normalization, but this prerequisite 
was also the only factor accentuated in a presumed sequence of normalization. After all, there are 
countless regional commitments to this precondition, especially the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative 
and recurrent affirmations by state leaders and governments of their allegiance to the creation of 
a Palestinian state.226 In fact, just three months before the announcement of UAE-Israel 
normalization, Middle East analyst Aaron David Miller expressed his doubts over full 
normalization between Israel and the Gulf states due to the latter’s attachment to the Palestinian 
cause, erroneously concluding that “then again [peace] was never in the cards.”227 The fact that 
the UAE fully normalized relations with Israel—especially in the absence of the prerequisite 
Palestinian peace deal and plurilateral normalization effort—surprised many. The dominance of 
Pan-Arab support of the Palestinian cause in the region, as well as the power of path dependence 
over Arab opposition to normalization in absence of a settlement with the Palestinians, were both 
strong forces that impeded official Arab-Israeli normalization for decades. 
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 However, an independent Palestinian state was also once believed to be the precondition 
for any sort of communication or interaction between Israel and the Arab world, which evidently 
occurred, nonetheless. As Jones and Guzansky explain in their book, 
“Where once a resolution to the question of Palestine was considered a prerequisite for 
any dialogue between Israel and its Arab neighbours, the realities of the contemporary 
Middle East created an environment in which pragmatism born of strategic need pushed 
the issue of Palestine to the margins.”228 
 
Therefore, if the shifting strategic realities and needs of the region were great enough to override 
such an established obstacle to any dialogue between Israel and the Gulf states, why was it 
assumed that could not be done again? In reflecting on the Accords, Miller admits that experts—
including himself—were mistaken in their previous assertions about Arab-Israeli progress 
because of their “old assumptions.”229 Just as the shift in regional interests facilitated initial 
contacts between Israel and the Gulf states amid vocal loyalty to the Palestinian cause, this 
breakthrough in 2020 was possible because regional priorities have changed. For one, Emirati 
and Israeli interests have been increasingly converging—including a shared fear of Iran and its 
proxy groups and the benefits of growing economic and technological ties. In addition, amid a 
downward trend of Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic unity, the Gulf states are less concerned with the 
stagnating Palestinian cause than they are with their own domestic and security issues.230  
 However, the fact that significant regional shifts demoted the Palestinian cause as a 
fundamental obstacle to Arab-Israeli normalization does not deny the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
its influence and leverage in these normalization efforts. Yet, rather than an effective impediment 
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to normalization, the Palestinians became simply another interest for both sides to consider. In 
fact, Israel’s efforts to annex parts of Palestinian territory served as an excellent opportunity for 
the UAE and Israel to pursue a “quid-pro-quo” agreement that satisfied both parties.231 
 Anwar Gargash, the UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, directly explained the 
timing of the Accords, admitting that while there will never be a “perfect moment” for 
normalization with Israel, waiting for such ideal circumstances would mean “standing still and 
letting developments sort of bypass you,” which he says “has been the case with the Palestinian 
issue historically.”232 In a separate interview, Gargash elaborated on the timing and conditions 
under which the UAE decided to pursue official normalization with Israel, indicating that formal 
relations were imminent, regardless of annexation:  
“Our calculations were very, very clear. Our calculations were, on the one hand, how can 
we do something while at the same time achieving something with regards to stopping 
annexation. And I think this was very successful by rationally and realistically coming 
across and saying, ‘we are formalizing a situation that is developing. This is where the 
relationship is going to go next year or the year after. Why don’t we do it now?’ And if 
we do it now, we can actually get something in return to support and help the region. And 
I think we just achieved that.”233  
 
Gargash further explained that the idea for a “win-win solution” emerged from universal concern 
expressed in Arab League meetings over annexation threatening to sabotage any prospects for a 
two-state solution.234 Ambassador Al Otaiba echoed this narrative that the Accords were pursued 
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as a measure to prevent annexation, proclaiming that “the beauty of the Abraham Accords is its 
simplicity: No annexation for normalization.”235 
 Although the UAE is firmly promoting this account of the Abraham Accords, it must be 
noted that not everyone accepts this explanation. Some view the deal as “cold, hard political 
opportunism taken at the expense of Palestinians,” asserting that the UAE may have attempted to 
represent itself as “Palestine’s Arab savior . . . but the reality is that Palestinians and their rights 
had nothing to do with it.”236 As opposed to this perception of a blatant betrayal of the 
Palestinian cause, others simply view annexation as a fortuitous opportunity that allowed 
Kushner to “[generate] an asset out of nothing” and Netanyahu to find a way out of his promise 
of annexation that lacked approval from the Trump administration.237 In this sense, many view 
the Palestinian issue as a “fictitious bargaining chip” that was fabricated solely to facilitate the 
Accords.238 Albeit in support for annexation, Professor Shmuel Trigano scrutinizes the reason for 
publicizing the July 1 annexation, just for Netanyahu to ultimately suspend the plan: 
On this point, it was disappointing to hear the PM announce the coming extension of 
Israeli law in an almost obsessive way, fail to implement it, and then cease entirely to 
discuss it. Why announce it if there was no intention of putting it in place? All he 
achieved was to unite the world in opposition to Israel for no purpose.239 
 
Although a conspiracy that the annexation plan was simply constructed to serve as leverage to 
attain normalization is unsubstantiated, the conception that annexation was simply used as a 
bargaining chip in negotiations—as expressed by the Emiratis—is widely accepted. 
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 Despite disapproval by Arab governments, officials, and groups in the region—which 
have been innocuous compared to the violent and severe reactions in 1979 and 1994—the UAE 
has confronted this criticism with affirmation of its unequivocal support for the Palestinians.240 
Not only does the UAE predicate the entire agreement on the elimination of annexation and the 
protection of the Palestinian people, but the UAE also portrays the Accords as a strategic move 
to assume a more involved and forceful role in advocating for the Palestinian cause.241 Further, 
some are peculiarly optimistic that the Accords could paradoxically facilitate a peace settlement 
between Israel and the Palestinians. While many rebuffed the possibility of Netanyahu’s 
suggestion in 2017 that “normalisation with Arab states could help pave the way for peace with 
the Palestinians,” this new political reality and regional environment have effectively eliminated 
the Palestinians’ veto power on Arab engagement with Israel.242 By reversing the preconceived 
sequence for normalization and peace in the Middle East and providing the UAE a potential 
strategic lobbying role on behalf of the Palestinians, the Accords might even have the potential to 
be the first step to facilitating the long awaited solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 Although the 2002 API has failed to endure as the framework through which Arab 
nations formalize relations with Israel, the Palestinian issue has remained a central factor in 
negotiations for normalization. In fact, the UAE believes that the Palestinians are undoubtedly 
the primary element of the agreement. However, whether the UAE genuinely wanted to protect 
the Palestinians and their cause at any cost or simply wanted to reap the strategic and economic 
benefits of formal cooperation with Israel is largely irrelevant when analyzing the role of 
 
240 Akhbar Alsaa, “Editorial: UAE's Position on the Palestinian Cause Is Unequivocal,” Emirates Center for 
Strategic Studies and Research, September 12, 2020. 
241 Ebtesam al-Ketbi, “Emirati-Israeli Peace Agreement: Could It Be a Game-Changer?” Emirates Policy Center, 
September 24, 2020. 
242 Binyamin Netanyahu, “Innovation Nation: The World in 2018,” The Economist, December 2017. 
 68 
annexation in facilitating the Abraham Accords. With annexation scheduled to commence on 
July 1, it is evident that annexation was the perfect and ‘ripe’ opportunity for all three parties 
involved to secure a mutually advantageous normalization agreement, regardless of their true 
intentions and attitudes towards annexation and the Palestinian cause.243 Ultimately, the timing 
of the Accords was largely contingent on the incidence of annexation scheduled a month earlier, 
which served as a chance for the all three states to act upon the strategic changes and security 
developments in the region that warranted a formal normalization agreement between the UAE 
and Israel. As Ambassador Al Otaiba explained, perhaps more sincerely than it may initially 
seem, “the truth is that the Abraham Accords were about preventing annexation. The reason it 
happened, the way it happened, at the time it happened was to prevent annexation.”244 Again, the 
genuine sentiments towards annexation are insignificant, for without annexation to serve as 
leverage, Anwar Gargash and the Gulf region would likely still be waiting for the “perfect 
moment” to officially normalize relations with Israel.245 
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Conclusion 
 The announcement of the Abraham Accords came as a surprise to many, even to those 
who had a proper understanding of the decades of tacit cooperation between Israel and the UAE. 
In this sense, the Accords were unexpected because of the timing and conditions under which 
Arab normalization with Israel occurred, which defied the longstanding presumption of a 
comprehensive peace settlement with the Palestinians and a subsequent plurilateral agreement 
between Israel and the Arab League. 
 The Abraham Accords differed in many ways from its predecessors. As opposed to 
Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the UAE was never in a state of war with Israel, 
and regional interests and public opinions have shifted considerably in recent years. Further, in 
contrast to its ‘cold peace’ with Egypt and Jordan, Israel’s decades of informal relations with the 
UAE have aptly prepared the two states for an unprecedented ‘warm peace.’  
This potential for a ‘warm peace’ between the UAE and Israel emerged from a long 
process of normalization, which began with the mutual decision to pursue covert ties in the 
1970s. As a conflict resolution strategy, normalization defies the presumed sequence for a peace 
settlement, as it can be used before, during, and after an agreement is reached. By aiming to 
improve bilateral relations through diplomatic, economic, security, and cultural connections, 
normalization is a tactic that ultimately builds trust, confidence, and respect between states. As 
demonstrated through communication theory and the theory of functionalism, these informal 
links effectively foster and promote cooperation between states through increased contact and a 
focus on mutual issues and interests. The characterization of UAE-Israel relations as a tacit 
security regime further explains the utility of this unofficial cooperation as a strategy of 
normalization to cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship between the UAE and Israel. I 
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ultimately apply the aforementioned theoretical concepts and empirical evidence to this 
framework and conclude that the TSR as a security and cooperation arrangement not only 
describes the pre-Accords collaboration between the UAE and Israel but also has the potential to 
serve as a normalization strategy to alter the cost-benefit balance for states pursuing a formal 
agreement. 
This new theory to explain the timing and conditions under which the Abraham Accords 
transpired is twofold. First, I explore how the TSR between the UAE and Israel as a tactic of pre-
Accords normalization laid the essential foundation for an agreement formalizing this tacit 
cooperation. Second, I describe how three fundamental factors converged as a perfect 
opportunity for the UAE and Israel to officially normalize relations in August 2020, including 
the changing security landscape, the role of the United States, and the Palestinian cause. While 
the increasing threat of Iran and the capacity of the US as a broker and valuable ally further 
advanced the momentum towards a normalization deal by increasing the benefits to enhanced 
cooperation, the exact timing of the agreement was a result of annexation. Regardless of the 
genuine intentions and attitudes towards Israel’s proposed annexation of the West Bank, the 
issue was a ripe opportunity for the UAE, Israel, and the US to finally negotiate a normalization 
agreement, successfully subverting the sole obstacle to Arab normalization with Israel. 
With several states following suit and normalizing relations with Israel—as well as the 
expectation of more to come—it is important to understand why and how the UAE and Israel 
decided to formalize their decades of tacit cooperation. Ultimately, along with a more 
threatening strategic environment and the asset of a valuable broker, the opportunity to use the 
one obstacle to normalization as a bargaining chip in negotiating the agreement effectively 
dictated the timing and conditions under which the Abraham Accords materialized. 
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Implications 
 In analyzing the timing and conditions under which the Abraham Accords transpired, I 
identify several theoretical and policy implications for my research.  
First, this theory is consequential for the framework of a TSR. As my research has 
demonstrated, the TSR has the potential and utility of strategically enabling full normalization 
between two countries, as well as a network of countries. While Jones and Guzansky 
prematurely denied this capacity, my work on the Abraham Accords has indicated a need for a 
revised paradigm of a TSR. In addition, this thesis also evinces the value of applying 
communication theory and the functional approach to inter-state normalization efforts in the 
realm of foreign relations. Hence, these theories would benefit from further research on their 
intersection with the field of foreign policy. My research can also further the study of ripeness 
and path dependence in changing longstanding policy decisions, as this thesis clearly 
underscores the certain conditions under which policymakers chose to change policy as a result 
of the shifting cost-benefit balance. Within the study of normalization, this thesis has significant 
implications. By emphasizing normalization’s role in conflict resolution before, during, and after 
a peace settlement, I advanced the theoretical discussion of normalization and conflict resolution.  
Second, I argue that the framework of a tacit security regime can be utilized as an 
effective strategy of normalization by states who aspire for formal relations with one another. As 
demonstrated through the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, pre-existing tacit cooperation provided a 
foundation for official normalization to occur. By establishing initial contacts in the area of 
mutual security interests and maintaining those as the focus around which other channels of 
cooperation can materialize, two states looking to someday formally normalize relations can 
pursue a tactic of developing a TSR, which allows states to circumvent political sensitivities that 
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might otherwise prevent such collaboration from manifesting. This strategy also effectively 
fosters respect, trust, and confidence between two states, allowing two countries to gradually 
improve relations and reap the benefits of cooperation prior to an official agreement normalizing 
relations, which increases the chances of a ‘warm peace’ to follow. 
 Third, my research has practical implications for the prospect of other Gulf states and 
Arab countries to formally normalize relations with Israel. While weaker states like Bahrain were 
able to use the UAE’s normalization as an opportunity and justification to normalize relations 
with Israel, my framework has the potential to explain the possibility of larger states in more 
precarious situations to pursue an agreement with Israel. For instance, Saudi Arabia and Israel—
who have pre-existing informal ties, mutual security interests, and close relations with the US—
might be able to navigate this framework and determine an opportunity to use as leverage for 
peace negotiations. Even states like Oman and Tunisia have the capacity to use this framework to 
work towards official normalization with Israel. Depending on changes in the regional landscape, 
my theory may have additional benefits in analyzing future normalization. Ultimately, this thesis 
also has the potential to be useful in other cases of normalization efforts in the world.  
 Overall, I anticipate my explanation of the Abraham Accords to be relevant for studies of 
normalization, cooperation, and negotiation. In understanding the timing and conditions under 
which the UAE and Israel decided to normalize relations, one can further recognize the 
importance of normalization in the field of conflict resolution, especially in regards to the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Although the Middle East is an everchanging regional landscape and home to 
several prolonged conflicts, I expect my research on the Abraham Accords and normalization to 
highlight the potential for cooperation and peace in the region—especially with the prospect of 
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